University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review

7-1-2012

Persecutory Agency In The Racial Prerequisite
Cases: Islam, Christianity, And Martyrdom In
United States v. Cartozian
Douglas M. Coulson

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr
Recommended Citation
Douglas M. Coulson, Persecutory Agency In The Racial Prerequisite Cases: Islam, Christianity, And Martyrdom In United States v.
Cartozian, 2 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 117 (2012)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr/vol2/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Race &
Social Justice Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

Persecutory Agency in the Racial Prerequisite Cases:
Islam, Christianity, and Martyrdom in United States v.
Cartozian

DOUGLAS M. COULSON

∗

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................119	
  
THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CARTOZIAN ....................131	
  
THE CARTOZIAN TRIAL: A STORY OF PERSECUTION AND MARTYRDOM
.......................................................................................................143	
  
THE “HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION” OF RACE AND THE PROBLEM OF
NARRATIVITY IN JUDGE WOLVERTON’S OPINION ........................166	
  
TRANSCENDING RACIAL DIVISIONS BY UNIFYING AGAINST COMMON
ENEMIES ........................................................................................178	
  

Douglas M. Coulson is an Assistant Instructor in the Department of Rhetoric
and Writing at the University of Texas at Austin, where he is also a PhD
candidate in English specializing in the study of forensic rhetoric. Before
beginning his doctoral work, Mr. Coulson received his JD from Tulane Law
School in 1999 and practiced complex business and commercial litigation in
the Houston office of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres and Friedman LLP. This
article reflects a portion of Mr. Coulson’s dissertation in progress regarding
the use of rhetorical strategies in judicial cases interpreting the racial
eligibility requirements in the early Naturalization Act. Mr. Coulson would
like to particularly thank Patricia Roberts-Miller, Susan Sage Heinzelman, and
Davida Charney for their generous support and advice on this article and on
his broader study of the rhetorical strategies of the racial prerequisite cases,
Kathleen Cleaver for her conversations with him regarding the Cartozian case
during her Spring 2009 American legal history seminar on race and
citizenship at the University of Texas School of Law, the extraordinarily
helpful archivists in the National Archives’ Pacific Region, Pacific Alaska
Region, and Washington, DC repositories for their assistance in identifying
and collecting the archival research discussed in this article, and Patricia
Flores and her colleagues at the University of Miami Race and Social Justice
Law Review for their assistance in preparing the article for publication.
∗

117

118

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2

This article examines the trial transcript and judicial opinion in
the 1924 naturalization trial of Tatos Cartozian, whose naturalization
was opposed by the United States Department of Labor based on the
assertion that as an Armenian he was not “white” and was therefore
racially ineligible for naturalization under a law that limited eligibility
for naturalization to “white persons” and other racial groups until
1952. The article situates the case within its legal and historical
context then examines the arguments advanced by the Armenian
defense during the trial as reflected in the transcript preserved by the
National Archives and Records Administration, particularly the
defense’s portrayal of Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims as historical
persecutors of Armenians in Asia Minor. The article argues that the
persecutory agency in the defense’s trial narrative created a powerful
sense of social solidarity with Americans by portraying Turkey as a
common enemy of Americans and Armenians during the post-World
War I era and examines the consequences of this rhetorical strategy.
After examining the transcript, the article then examines how the
judicial opinion responds to the defense’s rhetorical strategy and
argues that although the opinion adopts the defense’s narrative, the
opinion reflects an inability or refusal to clearly delineate the agency
in the narrative, is marked by a style that suggests a broader resistance
to narrativity, and remains silent on the Armenian genocide and
diaspora at the center of the case, all of which suggest an
uncomfortable relationship to the “historical interpretation” of race
that had recently emerged as an interpretive strategy in the case law
surrounding the Naturalization Act. The article concludes by reflecting
on the rhetorical strategy of unification against a common enemy
found in Cartozian and elsewhere in the discourse regarding the racial
prerequisite in the early Naturalization Act, what the strategy suggests
about the function of narrative in naturalization discourse, and how
the strategy helped to define American identity amid growing tensions
between race, nationality, and religion in the early twentieth century.

2012] PERSECUTORY AGENCY IN THE RACIAL PREREQUISITE CASES

119

INTRODUCTION
Q. Are there not also Armenians who are Mohammedans?
A. Not one, only if they have become Mohammedan by force, by
persecution . . . .
Q. But people of Armenian origin and race and blood do belong
to the Mohammedan faith; have joined that faith? Is that not true?
A. By force, perhaps, they have been made, during the massacres,
to save their lives.
Cross-examination of M.B. Parounagian during the 1924
naturalization trial of Tatos Cartozian1
I found that Armenians assimilate with American life more
readily than any other race from Southeastern Europe or Asia Minor,
for two reasons. One is that the American missionaries who have been
working in Armenia and among the Armenians for one hundred years
have acquainted the American public about the Armenians. . . . The
other reason is that Armenians have been known among the Christian
people of Europe and America as the great defenders of the Christian
religion, and I believe there is an admiration for the Armenians for the
way they have withstood the onslaught of Mohammedanism.
Direct examination of M. Vartan Malcolm, author of The
Armenians in America, during the 1924 naturalization trial of Tatos
Cartozian2
Q. What was the attitude of the Armenian race in so far as you
came in contact with them during the World War?
A. It was one of the most inspiring experiences in my life. They
were willing to serve, not only as enemies of Turkey, not only to defend
their own native country, but they felt a deep loyalty to this country. All
of them were willing to enter the army; and I know a great many cases
of Armenians who came a great distance, paid their own expenses and
entered the United States army and never were sent across to fight the
Turks.
Direct examination of Mrs. Otis Floyd Lamson during the 1924
1. Transcript of Evidence, United States v. Cartozian, No. E-8668 (D. Or. May 89, 1924), at 17-18, in Civil and Criminal Case Files, District of Oregon (Portland),
Records of the District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21, National
Archives and Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, Wash.
[hereinafter Cartozian Trial Transcript].
2. Id. at 126-27.
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naturalization trial of Tatos Cartozian3
The epigraphs above appear in the transcript of a trial that was
held in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon on
May 8-9, 1924 to determine whether Armenian immigrant Tatos
Cartozian was eligible to become an American citizen by
naturalization. The United States Bureau of Naturalization, then under
the direction of the Department of Labor and represented by attorneys
from the Department of Justice, opposed Cartozian’s naturalization
based on the assertion that as an Armenian he was not “white” and was
therefore racially ineligible for naturalization. The Naturalization Act
of 1790 limited eligibility for naturalization to “free white persons,”
and in 1870, after Pacific Coast senators who sought to prevent the
naturalization of Chinese immigrants defeated a Civil War
Reconstruction amendment that sought to remove the racial
requirement from the Act, a compromise amendment was passed
extending racial eligibility for naturalization to both “free white
persons” and “aliens of African nativity and persons of African
descent.” Consequently, from 1870 to 1940, to be eligible for
naturalization a person had to be either “white” or “African,” but the
racial eligibility of Asian petitioners remained disputed because some
claimed that they fit neither of the racial categories recognized by the
Act.4 Although after 1940 eligibility for naturalization was also
extended to “descendants of races indigenous to the Western
Hemisphere,” “Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent,”
“Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent,” and “persons of
races indigenous to India,” the Act continued to limit eligibility by race
until the racial prerequisites were finally removed in 1952.5
During this period any court of general jurisdiction could grant a
naturalization certificate, and until the late nineteenth century no
3. Id. at 60-61.
4. See Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (1790); Naturalization Act
of Jan. 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414 (1795); Naturalization Act of Apr. 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 153
(1802); Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1802, 2 Stat. 292 (1804); Naturalization Act of
May 26, 1824, 4 Stat. 69 (1824); Naturalization Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 254
(1870); Revised Statutes §§ 2165-74 (1875);.Act of Feb. 18, 1875, 18 Stat. 316 (1875);
Revised Statutes §§ 2165-74 (2d ed. 1878); DARRELL HEVENOR SMITH, THE BUREAU OF
NATURALIZATION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION (1926).
5. See Naturalization Act of Oct. 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940); Naturalization
Act of Dec. 17, 1943, 57 Stat. 600 (1943); Naturalization Act of July 2, 1946, 60 Stat.
416 (1946).
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published judicial opinions were issued regarding the racial
prerequisite in the Act.6 Between 1878 and 1954, however, numerous
federal and state courts, and ultimately the United States Board of
Immigration Appeals, issued written opinions offering interpretations
of the phrase “white person” in response to the naturalization petitions
of numerous immigrants from Asia and the Pacific Rim.7 These cases,
which have come to be known as the “racial prerequisite cases,” offer
conflicting opinions about the meaning of race in cases involving
Chinese, American Indian, Hawaiian, Burmese, Japanese, Asian
Indian, Mexican, Parsi, Filipino, Syrian, Korean, Afghan, Iraqi,
Armenian, Turkish, Arabian, Tatar, and Kalmyk petitioners.8 The
courts in these cases frequently noted the difficulty of determining the
racial classification of individual petitioners and appealed to Congress
6. See SMITH, supra note 4.
7. Only two of the cases addressed the subsequent extension of the act to non“white” racial classifications. One case addressed the meaning of the phrase “aliens of
African nativity and persons of African descent,” see In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774
(E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that a petitioner who was three-quarters Native American
and one-quarter African was not of sufficient “African descent” to be eligible under the
Act), and another case addressed the meaning of the phrase “persons of Chinese
descent,” see In re B–-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 304 (B.I.A. 1948) (holding that a person born in
Germany of a German mother, but of a father who was Siamese but “predominantly
Chinese in blood,” was neither a “white person” nor a “person of Chinese descent”).
8. For a comprehensive list of published judicial opinions addressing the racial
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, see IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1st ed. 1996). In addition to the cases identified by
López, the United States Board of Immigration Appeals issued a series of racial
prerequisite cases under § 13(c) of the Immigration Act of 1924, which prohibited the
admission to the United States of any alien “ineligible to citizenship” as defined in part
by the racial eligibility provisions of the Naturalization Act. See Immigration Act of
1924, §§ 13(c), 28(c), 43 Stat. 153 (1924). See also In re S–-, 1 I & N Dec. 174 (B.I.A.
1941) (holding that a native and citizen of Iraq, whose parents were “full-blooded
Arabians” and whose ancestors “came from Turkish stock,” was a “white person”); In
re K–-, 2 I & N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 1945) (holding that a native and citizen of
Afghanistan, “of the Afghan race,” was a “white person”); In re B–-, 3 I. & N. Dec.
304 (B.I.A 1948) (holding that a person born in Germany of a German mother, but of a
father who was Siamese but “predominantly Chinese in blood,” was neither a “white
person” nor a “person of Chinese descent”); In re S–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 104 (B.I.A. 1950)
(holding that a native and citizen of Russia “of the Tartar race, born in Ufa, Russia,”
was a “white person”); In re R–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 1951) (holding that natives
of Russia “whose blood was found to be predominantly that of the Kalmuk race” were
“white persons”); In re J–- W–- F–-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 200 (B.I.A. 1954) (holding that a
native of the Philippines, but “racially Chinese (full blood)” was not a “white person”).
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to clarify the meaning of the Act, and the opinions conflicted so widely
that one court labeled the racial classification issue a “Serbonian bog.”9
Because the racial prerequisite cases required litigants, lawyers,
and judges to advance arguments and evidence in support of particular
racial classifications in the procedurally structured setting of a judicial
proceeding with formal provisions for discovery, the subpoena of
witnesses and other evidence, and opportunities for both sides to be
heard, the cases offer a unique opportunity to study the rhetorical
dimensions of racial discourse and the role of law in constructing racial
identities. As Ian Haney López writes in White by Law: The Legal
Construction of Race, the racial prerequisite cases litigated whether,
for example, “a petitioner’s race was to be measured by skin color,
facial features, national origin, language, culture, ancestry, the
speculations of scientists, popular opinion, or some combination of
these factors,”10 and the rhetorical strategies employed in advancing
one or more of these factors in particular cases provide a rich source
for studying the discourse of race and law. The racial prerequisite cases
are also unique because they forced participants to contrast “white” not
with the racial category of “black” or “African” but with “Asian,” as
numerous immigrants from Asia and the Pacific Rim, including many
from western Asia and the Middle East, petitioned for naturalization.
Although Europeans often described Chinese and Japanese people as
“white” in their first encounters with them11 and early courts granted
Chinese immigrants naturalization certificates without apparently
9. See In re Dow, 213 F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915).
The figure of a Serbonian bog derives from Lake Sardonis, said to have been between
Egypt and Palestine, which had the deceptive appearance of solid ground because of
the sand that blew into it. The phrase figuratively refers to any situation from which it
is difficult to extricate oneself. Cf. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 592-94 (David Scott
Kastan, ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2005) (“A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog / . . .
Where armies whole have sunk . . . .”).
10. LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 2.
11. See MICHAEL KEEVAK, BECOMING YELLOW: A SHORT HISTORY OF RACIAL
THINKING 4, 27, 37, 41-42 (2011). Early classifications of Chinese and Japanese people
as “white” even used particularly unequivocal descriptions such as “rather white”
(zimblich weiß), “truly white” (véritablement blanc), “completely white” (fulkomligen
hvita), “white like us” (bianchi, si come siamo noi), and “as white as we are” (aussi
blancs que nous). Id. In one particularly noteworthy example, George Washington
wrote in 1785 correspondence to his former aid-de-camp, Tinch Tilghman, that he was
surprised to receive a report that Chinese sailors resembled American Indians because
he “had conceived an idea that the Chinese, tho’ droll in shape and appearance, were
yet white.” Id. at 36.
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questioning their racial eligibility for naturalization,12 by the midnineteenth century racialist science had begun to advance the theory
that Asians belonged to a “yellow” race that occupied a suspect
“middle” position between the “white” and “black” races.13 The racial
prerequisite cases challenged this newly emerging distinction between
“white” and “yellow” races as petitioners from all corners of Asia
claimed to be “white.”
Although few records of the proceedings in the racial prerequisite
cases exist, Cartozian is a remarkable exception because the National
Archives and Records Administration has preserved a nearly complete
record of the proceedings in the case, including a 167-page transcript
of a two-day trial, a 97-page transcript of four expert depositions, a 30page defense brief, trial exhibits, and other documents, and because the
Armenian lobby mounted an unparalleled defense in the case.
According to one source, the Armenian community raised
approximately $50,000 in donations to defend the case (equivalent to
over $500,000 today), and shortly after the case was filed the lead
attorney for the Armenian defense informed the Government’s attorney
in the case that the Armenians would spare no expense to defend the
case.14 The defense hired the prestigious Portland law firm McCamant
and Thompson to represent Cartozian and offered the testimony of
twenty-three witnesses at trial, including renowned Columbia
University anthropologist Franz Boas, Harvard ethnologist Roland

12. Until the Chinese Exclusion Act expressly prohibited Chinese naturalizations in
1882, courts frequently granted Chinese immigrants naturalization certificates as
reflected, for example, in accounts of Chinese naturalizations in New York and North
Carolina as early as the 1830s. See, e.g., JOHN KUO WEI TCHEN, NEW YORK BEFORE
CHINATOWN: ORIENTALISM AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1776-1882, at 76,
136, 231-32 (1999). Furthermore, a July 22, 1870 newspaper article recounts
Massachusetts’ longstanding practice of naturalizing “Chinese as well as other
Asiatics” since at least 1843, along with “natives of the Sandwich Islands” and
“persons of African descent, who are not darker than ordinary white persons.” See
BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, July 22, 1870, at column A. As late as the turn of the
twentieth century, the United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts also
found that it had long been its practice to admit Asians to citizenship. See In re
Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 843-44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
13. See KEEVAK, supra note 11, at 19, 49, 60, 74-75.
14. See Earlene Craver, On the Boundary of White: The Cartozian Naturalization
Case and the Armenians, 1923-1925, 28 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 30 (2009); Phillip
Lothyan, A Questions of Citizenship, 3 PROLOGUE 21, 267, at 272 (Fall 1989).
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Dixon, German geographer and political economist Paul Rohrbach, and
James Barton, foreign secretary of the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions who headed the relief expedition
in Turkey after World War I. The defense also offered twenty-two
exhibits into evidence, including a comparative list of English and
Armenian words and a tabulation of 339 answers to a questionnaire
sent to Armenian men in the United States regarding their residence,
citizenship, occupation, and membership in Christian churches and
professional, civic, and fraternal organizations.15 The record of these
proceedings offers the most detailed record available of the arguments
and evidence advanced to determine whether an individual petitioner
was “white” within the meaning of the racial prerequisite in the
Naturalization Act.
Despite this substantial record, prior scholars have largely treated
Cartozian as a footnote to the earlier case of In re Halladjian, in which
a federal district court in Massachusetts held that four Armenians were
“white” and therefore racially eligible for naturalization,16 a case that
had served as precedent on the question of Armenian eligibility for
naturalization before Cartozian. Furthermore, those scholars who have
discussed Cartozian have mostly limited their remarks to the
arguments and evidence presented by the defense regarding Armenian
assimilability with “white” Europeans and Americans, including
ethnographic and statistical evidence of prior Armenian naturalizations
in the United States and Armenian marriages to contemporary
Europeans and Americans. In Whitewashed: America’s Invisible
Middle Eastern Minority, for example, John Tehranian argues that
Cartozian epitomizes performative aspects of whiteness reflected in the
racial prerequisite cases and concludes that “performance of whiteness
and perceived assimilatory capacity played a critical role in the court’s
decision” in the case.17 Similarly, in an article in the National Archives
publication Prologue, Phillip Lothyan focuses exclusively on evidence
of census figures regarding the number of Armenian naturalizations in
the United States, evidence of affinities between European and
Armenian languages, and evidence that Armenians intermarried and
15. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at a-d, 104; United States v.
Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D. Or. 1925). See also Craver, supra note 14, at 44-51.
16. See In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
17. JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN
MINORITY 51-54 (2009).
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assimilated quickly with Europeans and Americans.18 In Ian Haney
López’s White by Law, the only book-length study of the racial
prerequisite cases, López only mentions Cartozian in passing to note
that Columbia University anthropologist Franz Boas provided expert
testimony in the case,19 and Matthew Frye Jacobson gives the case a
similar treatment in Whiteness of a Different Color: European
Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race,”20 as does Ariela Gross in What
Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America.21
The epigraphs above reveal another rhetorical strategy that played
a dominant role in the trial and judicial opinion in Cartozian, however,
a strategy that is the inverse of Armenian assimilability with “white”
Europeans and Americans. According to the Armenian defense, it was
significant not only that the Armenians readily assimilated with
Europeans and Americans but that Armenians were entirely
inassimilable with their Islamic neighbors in Asia Minor. According to
the defense, this inassimilability was evidenced by Armenian support
of Europeans during the Crusades and by Muslim persecution of the
18. See Lothyan, supra note 14. Likewise, in a recent article discussing the archival
records in the case, Earlene Craver focuses primarily on the direct evidence of
assimilability in the case. See Craver, supra note 14, at 56.
19. LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 4-5.
20. See MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 240 (1998).
21. See ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL
IN AMERICA 235 (2008); see also Janice Okoomian, Becoming White: Contested
History, Armenian American Women, and Racialized Bodies, 27 MELUS 213, no. 1,
Spring 2002 (emphasizing direct evidence of assimilability in the case). At least one
later court also emphasizes the direct evidence of assimilability in Cartozian. In In re
Hassan, Judge Arthur Tuttle cites Cartozian in support of his holding that an “Arab,
being a native of Yemen,” was not a “white person” and was therefore racially
ineligible for naturalization. See In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
Judge Tuttle states:
It is recognized that in United States v. Cartozian . . . , the District
Court held an Armenian from Asia Minor eligible to citizenship as a
white person. The court there found, however, that the Armenians are
a Christian people living in an area close to the European border, who
have intermingled and intermarried with Europeans over a period of
centuries. Evidence was also presented in that case of a considerable
amount of intermarriage of Armenian immigrants to the United States
with other racial strains in our population. These facts serve to
distinguish the case of the Armenians from that of the Arabians.
Id. at 846.
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Armenians since the rise of the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the
Armenian genocide of World War I. This rhetorical strategy operated
on many levels, but it particularly appealed to the process of
transcending social division by adopting a perspective of unity in
relation to shared fear of an outgroup threat, a process Kenneth Burke
describes as “identification by antithesis,” in which “allies who would
otherwise dispute among themselves join forces against a common
enemy.”22 In the epigraphs above, M.B. Parounagian testifies that the
Armenians were persecuted by Ottoman Turks who forced Armenians
to convert to Islam “during the massacres, to save their lives,” a
reference to the Turkish massacres of Armenians that escalated during
the 1890s through the Armenian genocide of World War I and resulted
in many Armenian refugees fleeing to the United States.23 Similarly,
M. Vartan Malcolm testifies that Europeans and Americans admired
Armenians as “the great defenders of the Christian religion” who
withstood “the onslaught of Mohammedanism” at the hands of the
Turks, and Mrs. Otis Floyd Lamson testifies of how Armenians fought
with American troops against a common enemy during World War I.
Similar references to the Crusades, the Hamidian massacres of
Armenians during the 1890s, and the Armenian genocide of World
War I are found throughout the trial transcript.
Many scholars have studied the tendency to unify against a
common enemy in the context of intergroup conflict and war. Social
scientists, for example, have studied the relationship between outgroup

22. See KENNETH BURKE, DRAMATISM AND DEVELOPMENT 28 (1972) [hereinafter
DRAMATISM]; see also KENNETH BURKE, The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM: STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC ACTION (3d ed. 1973). Burke
also notes that this antithetical form of identification can serve to deflect criticism,
because “a politician can call any criticism of his policies ‘unpatriotic,’ on the grounds
that it reinforces the claims of the nation’s enemies.” See DRAMATISM, supra, at 28.
Burke introduced “identification” as the central concept of the rhetoric of symbolic
action to replace the more instrumental and propositional rhetorics of earlier theorists.
In contrast to such earlier rhetorics, Burke proposed that persuasion operates by the
process of merger and division by which people form collective identities, or by the
perennial struggle between “us” and “them.” See Identification, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RHETORIC 375, 375 (Thomas O. Sloane ed., 2001).
23. Indeed, most Armenian immigrants who came to the United States during the
early twentieth century came as refugees. See LESLIE A. DAVIS, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE
PROVINCE: AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT’S REPORT ON THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE, 19151917 (Susan K. Blair ed., 1989).
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threats and ingroup cooperation,24 and scholars in rhetorical and
literary studies, political science, and history have all studied the use of
shared enmities to construct group identities in the writing of history,
literature, and war propaganda.25 Similarly, veteran war correspondents
have written extensively about the powerful solidarity formed among
those engaged in war.26 Such studies frequently note the deep
emotional attachment that results from fear of a common enemy and
the costly sacrifices individuals experiencing this attachment make to
defend the group. As Chris Hedges writes, “the communal march
against an enemy generates a warm, unfamiliar bond with our
neighbors, our community, our nation, wiping out unsettling

24. See, e.g., Masaki Yuki and Kunihiro Yokota, The Primal Warrior: Outgroup
Threat Priming Enhances Intergroup Discrimination in Men But Not Women, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 271 (Jan. 2009); see also, e.g., LAWRENCE LESHAN, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR: COMPREHENDING ITS MYSTIQUE AND ITS MADNESS (1992); Mark
Van Vugt, David De Cremer, and Dirk P. Janssen, Gender Differences in Cooperation
and Competition: The Male Warrior Hypothesis, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 19 (Jan. 2007). In a
classic investigation of intergroup conflict known as the Robbers Cave experiment,
researchers studied the effectiveness of measures to reduce intergroup conflict among
youth groups at a summer camp and concluded that the most effective method for
reducing the conflict was the introduction of a series of superordinate goals requiring
intergroup cooperation. See MUZAHER SHERIF, O.J. HARVEY, B. JACK WHITE, WILLIAM
R. HOOD, AND CAROLYN W. SHERIF, THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1961). Although the Robbers Cave researchers claim to
have rejected the introduction of a “common enemy” as a means of reducing the
conflict in their experiment because it implied intergroup conflict on a larger scale, in
at least one of the experiments they suggested to their subjects that “vandals” may have
been responsible for an interruption of water supply that intergroup cooperation was
required to restore. Id.
25. See, e.g., SUSAN A. BREWER, WHY AMERICA FIGHTS: PATRIOTISM AND WAR
PROPAGANDA FROM THE PHILIPPINES TO IRAQ 46-86 (2009); JEFFREY JEROME COHEN,
HYBRIDITY, IDENTITY AND MONSTROSITY IN MEDIEVAL BRITAIN: ON DIFFICULT
MIDDLES (2006); MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE 66-89
(1988); JEREMY ENGELS, ENEMYSHIP: DEMOCRACY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC (2010); IGAL HALFIN, INTIMATE ENEMIES: DEMONIZING THE
BOLSHEVIK OPPOSITION, 1918-1928 (2007); DOUGLAS WALTON, APPEAL TO PITY:
ARGUMENTUM AD MISERICORDIAM (1997); Robert L. Ivie, Images of Savagery in
American Justifications for War, 47 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS 279 (1980); Eve
Kornfeld, Encountering “the Other”: American Intellectuals and Indians in the 1790s,
52 WM. & MARY Q. 287 (1995); Vladimir Zorić, The Furies of Orestes: Constructing
Persecutory Agency in Narratives of Exile, 5 COMP. CRITICAL STUD. 179 (2008).
26. See, e.g., CHRIS HEDGES, WAR IS A FORCE THAT GIVES US MEANING (2002);
ANTHONY LLOYD, MY WAR GONE BY, I MISS IT SO (1999).
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undercurrents of alienation and dislocation,”27 and Sam Keen notes in
his study of political propaganda that “the majority of tribes and
nations create a sense of social solidarity and membership in part by
systematically creating enemies.”28 In Cartozian, the defense sought to
defend Armenians’ racial identity with “white” America by not only
offering direct evidence of their assimilability with Europeans and
Americans, but through what Murray Edelman calls a “dramaturgy of
enmity”29 that invoked anti-Islamic prejudice encoded in centuries of
cultural memories of the Crusades, a narrative that represented
Armenians as Christian martyrs at the hands of “black pagans, Turks,
and Saracens.”30 This narrative also echoed American war propaganda
during World War I that had thematically invoked the imagery of the
Crusades in portrayals of the war as a war between “white” Christians
and dark barbarian “Huns,” and appealed to significant tensions that
lingered between the United States and Turkey during the postwar
period as a result of Turkey’s opposition to the establishment of an
independent republic of Armenia and its continued massacres of
Armenians and American missionaries. Accordingly, the defense’s
narrative of persecution by the Ottoman Turks in Cartozian appealed
both to historical fears of barbarian invaders in medieval Europe
recently called to mind by American war propaganda and to
contemporary fears of Turkish aggression.31
27. HEDGES, supra note 26, at 9, 45, 74.
28. SAM KEEN, FACES OF THE ENEMY: REFLECTIONS OF THE HOSTILE IMAGINATION
17 (1986). Keen argues that “we scapegoat and create absolute enemies, not because
we are intrinsically cruel, but because focusing our anger on an outside target, striking
at strangers, brings our tribe or nation together allows us to be part of a close and
loving in-group.” Id. at 27. Thus, according to Keen “we create surplus evil because
we need to belong.” Id.
29. See EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 78, 83. In his discussion of the rhetorical
construction of political enemies, Edelman writes that “the highlighting of foreign
enemies to weaken domestic dissent or divert attention from domestic problems is a
classic political gambit because it is so often an effective one.” Id.
30. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Richard II, in THE OXFORD SHAKESPEARE THE
COMPLETE WORKS 339, 359 (John Jowett et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Richard
II] (“Many a time hath banish’d Norfolk fought / For Jesus Christ in glorious Christian
field / Streaming the ensign of the Christian cross / Against black pagans, Turks, and
Saracens”). This passage of Richard II is quoted in Judge Lowell’s opinion in In re
Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
31. See, e.g., BREWER, supra note 25, at 46-86. The postwar tension between the
United States and Turkey related in large part to the status of Armenian refugees
created by the Armenian genocide of World War I and efforts to establish an
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Significantly, although prior critics have argued that direct
evidence of assimilability played a pivotal role in the racial prerequisite
cases and Cartozian in particular, this emphasis on direct evidence of
assimilability fails to account, on the one hand, for cases in which
petitioners were held to be racially ineligible for naturalization despite
having offered powerful assimilability evidence, and on the other hand
for cases in which petitioners were held racially eligible for
naturalization despite having offered relatively little assimilability
evidence. In a case decided only two years before Cartozian, for
example, the United States Supreme Court noted that although
Japanese petitioner Takao Ozawa had attended American schools and
churches with his family and maintained the use of English in his
home, because he belonged to the “Japanese race” he was not “white”
and was therefore racially ineligible for naturalization.32 Similarly, the
independent republic of Armenia. Although President Wilson initially awarded
territory to establish an independent republic of Armenia in the Treaty of Sèvres, after
Turkish nationalists gained independence for Turkey they renegotiated the terms of
postwar peace in the Treaty of Lausanne which established the current borders of
Turkey and awarded no territory to Armenia. The United States Senate refused to ratify
the Treaty of Lausanne, but it nonetheless prevailed as the final negotiation of
Turkey’s postwar borders after the other major powers ratified it. See generally
STANFORD J. SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY (1976).
Even before World War I, conflict between the United States and the Ottoman Empire
had emerged over the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act. On November 1,
1909, shortly after the Chief of the Naturalization Division of the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization issued a restrictive interpretation of the racial
prerequisite that concluded Turks, Syrians, and other “Asiatics” were non-“white” and
therefore ineligible for naturalization, the Turkish embassy vigorously protested the
Bureau’s position. See generally Turkey Will Protest, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1909;
Conflicting Views Taken of Asiatic Exclusion, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1909;
Aliens Refused Naturalization, DULUTH (MINN.) NEWS TRIBUNE, Sept. 29, 1909; Race
Row Up To Courts, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1909. This protest included an open letter
from the Ottoman Charge d’Affairs denouncing the Bureau’s position in the
Washington Post, calling the Bureau’s interpretation of the act as “pernicious as it is
artificial, since it is calculated to hinder the cause of peace, amity, and brotherhood
among the natives, that cause so eloquently preached from the American pulpit and
tribune.” A. Rustem Bey, Thinks Law Unfair, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1909.
32. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 189-190 (1922). Ozawa argued that
the Japanese were assimilable with life in the United States in part by noting that “in
art and literature, the criticism of the Japanese today is of the abandonment of their
ideas, and too easy adaptation to western methods.” Like the defense in Cartozian,
Ozawa also cited Japanese marriages to Europeans and Americans. Brief for Petitioner
at 78, Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1918) (No. 222). In addition, Ozawa
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina
repeatedly held that Syrian petitioners were not “white” and were
therefore racially ineligible for naturalization despite ample evidence
that they belonged to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition by both
faith and geography and in the face of the assertion that any
interpretation of the Naturalization Act that excluded them would also
exclude those with similar origins, including, hypothetically, Jesus of
Nazareth.33 On the other hand, various Turkish, Arab, Parsi, Asian
Indian, and Kalmyk petitioners were held to be “white” and therefore
racially eligible for naturalization despite their geographical origins in
Asia and their Islamic, Zoroastrian, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist
religious backgrounds.34 These and other racial prerequisite cases
cannot be understood solely by reference to direct evidence of
assimilability or the “performance of whiteness and perceived
assimilatory capacity.”35
To explore these issues, this article will examine the rhetorical
strategies reflected in Cartozian. The article will begin by situating the
case within its historical context during a time of crisis for Armenian
refugees as postwar negotiations for an independent Armenia grew
increasingly doubtful and within the legal context of case law

quoted an American educator who had written that “those Japanese born and nurtured
in Hawaii are as much American as the children of the descendants of the Pilgrim
Fathers that came to this country to Christianize the Hawaiians.” Id. at 83.
33. See Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 816 (E.D.S.C. 1913); see also In re Dow, 213
F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914). The decisions in these cases were later reversed by Dow v.
United States, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915). See generally Sarah Gualtieri, Becoming
“White”: Race, Religion and the Foundations of Syrian/Lebanese Ethnicity in the
United States, 20 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 29, 41-42 (2001).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1910); In re
Mozumdar, 207 F. 115, 117 (E.D. Wash. 1913); In re Singh, 257 F. 209, 212 (S.D.
Cal. 1919); In re Sallak, No. 14876 (N.D. Ill., East. Div., June 27, 1924), in Significant
Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925, District of Oregon (Portland), Records of
U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group 118, National Archives and Records
Administration Pacific Alaska Region (holding that a petitioner “born in Palestine”
was a “white person”); In re S–-, 1 I & N Dec. 174 (B.I.A. 1941); Ex parte Mohriez,
54 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944); In re Shaikhaly, Nat. Case No. 119332 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 20, 1944), in Folder 119332, Contested Naturalizations, Southern District of
California, Central Division (Los Angeles), National Archives and Records
Administration Pacific Region (holding that “a native and citizen of Palestine . . . of
the Arabian race,” was a “white person”); In re K–-, 2 I & N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 1945);
In re R–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 1951).
35. TEHRANIAN, supra note 17, at 51-54.
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interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act,
particularly the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Ozawa v.
United States (1922) and United States v. Thind (1923). The article will
then examine the rhetorical strategy of the Armenian defense reflected
in the trial transcript, particularly the portrayal of Turks, Kurds, and
Syrian Muslims as historical persecutors of Armenians. The article
argues that by portraying Turkey as a common enemy during the
postwar period the defense’s narrative created a powerful sense of
social solidarity with Americans, but that the trial transcript also
reflects a tension between this strategy and Armenians’ protonationalist
aspirations for an independent nation and was premised on a negation
of Armenian national agency that metaphorically echoed the genocide
the Armenians suffered in World War I, highlighting difficult identity
issues in the case that the judicial opinion does not reflect. The article
then examines Judge Charles Wolverton’s judicial opinion in
Cartozian in light of the arguments advanced during the trial and
argues that although Judge Wolverton adopts the defense’s narrative of
Armenian inassimilability with the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims
of Asia Minor as a central justification for his conclusion that
Armenians are “white,” his opinion leaves the agency in the historical
narrative on which he relies ambiguous and reflects a broader refusal
of narrativity that suggests an uncomfortable relationship with the
“historical interpretation” of race that had recently emerged in case law
interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act. The article
concludes by reflecting more generally on the rhetorical strategy of
unifying against a common enemy as a strategy evident throughout the
long of discourse surrounding the racial prerequisites to naturalization
and how this strategy helped to define American identity amid growing
tensions between race, nationality, and religion in the early twentieth
century.

THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CARTOZIAN
On April 24, 2010, President Barack Obama marked the ninetyfifth anniversary of the Armenian genocide by remarking that “on this
solemn day of remembrance, we pause to recall that 95 years ago one
of the worst atrocities of the 20th century began,” for “in that dark
moment of history, 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched
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to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.”36 Between
1894 and 1896, Turkish attacks on the Armenian minority in the
Ottoman Empire resulted in the deaths of approximately 100,000250,000 Armenians in what were referred to as the Hamidian
massacres, named after Sultan Abdul Hamid II, also known as the
“Red Sultan” or the “Bloody Sultan” for his Armenian massacres.
Following the rise of the Young Turks, another 15,000-25,000
Armenians were massacred in the region of Adana, Turkey in the
spring of 1909, and experts estimate that between one to one and a half
million Armenians were killed in the Ottoman Empire during World
War I in what is widely referred to as the Armenian genocide. As
Vahakn Dadrian remarks, although the number of Armenians who died
during World War I gives that period a particular gravity, the
Armenian genocide was “punctuated by a history of accumulative
tensions, animosities, and attendant sanguinary persecutions, . . .
anchored on a constantly evolving and critically escalating perpetratorvictim conflict” extending deep into the history of Anatolia.37 This
perpetrator-victim conflict is crucial to understanding the arguments
advanced in support of Armenian racial eligibility for naturalization in
Cartozian.
Many critics have argued that the treatment of the Armenian
Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire was an incident of the rising
nationalisms of the early twentieth century and the volatile nature of
state boundaries in the Balkans, Anatolia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus,
which had a profound impact on previously tolerated subjects like the
Armenians. According to Cathie Carmichael, for example, many of
these people, including the Armenians, never made the transition from
subject to citizen. As a result, the practice of population elimination in
Europe and western Asia from the nineteenth through the midtwentieth century occurred because certain groups never received full
citizenship rights.38 Tragically, the idea that conflicts of nationality and
citizenship could be resolved by violent population elimination
inspired a generation of such “eliminationists,” as reflected in the
question Adolf Hitler is reported to have put to German troops before
36. Peter Baker, Obama Marks Genocide Without Saying the Word, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2010, at A10.
37. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation, in AMERICA
AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE OF 1915, at 52 (Jay Winter ed., 2003).
38. See CATHIE CARMICHAEL, GENOCIDE BEFORE THE HOLOCAUST 3 (2009).
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the invasion of Poland after instructing them to kill all Polish men,
women, and children they found: “Who, after all, speaks today about
the annihilation of the Armenians?”39 As this statement suggests, such
eliminationist campaigns have often sought to eliminate not only the
physical presence of the populations they targeted but their historical
presence as well.40 Although the international movement for
recognition of the Armenian genocide has recently established it as one
of the three canonical genocides alongside the Holocaust and Rwanda,
for decades it was so immersed in silence that it was often referred to
as the “forgotten genocide,” the “unremembered genocide,” the
“hidden holocaust,” or the “secret genocide,”41 and it has remained the
object of genocide denial by Turkey from the immediate postwar
period to the present.42
The phrase “crimes against humanity” was originally coined to
refer to the Armenian genocide and the first war crimes tribunals in
Turkish history were convened to prosecute Ottoman officials for their
treatment of Armenians during the war,43 but under the pressure of
39. See id. at 3, 10; see also ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE
INTRODUCTION 149 (2d ed., 2011).
40. As Lawrence Douglas notes of Israeli Attorney General Gideon Hausner’s
approach to the subsequent trial of Adolph Eichmann, Hausner treated the Nazis’ crime
“as both the act of physical annihilation and the more profound attempt to erase
memory itself—both of the cultural life of a people and of the crimes of the final
solution.” LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND
MEMORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 106 (2001).
41. See PETER BALAKIAN, THE BURNING TIGRIS: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND
AMERICA’S RESPONSE xii (2003); JONES, supra note 39.
42. See generally BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 11; DONALD BLOXHAM & FATMA
MÜGE GÖÇEK, The Armenian Genocide, in THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE 360
(Dan Stone ed., 2008); ROBERT KOOLAKIAN, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A STORY OF THE
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARMENIA, 1915-1920, at 21-23
(2008). For recent news regarding Turkey’s aggressive campaign to deny the
Armenian genocide, see, e.g., David Rennie, France to Jail Deniers of Armenian
Genocide, THE DAILY TEL. (London), Oct. 13, 2006, at 21; Sebnem Arsu, Turks Angry
Over House Armenian Genocide Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007.
43. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 331-47; JONES, supra note 39. Significantly,
these proceedings resulted in a number of guilty verdicts and executions before they
were abandoned. See, e.g., Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Naim-Andonian Documents on the
World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide, 18 INT’L
J. MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 311-60 (1986): 311-60; Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Turkish
Military Tribunal’s Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major
Court-Martial Series, 11 HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUDIES 28-59 (1997)
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Turkish nationalism the war crimes tribunals were soon abandoned and
the major powers stopped publicly confronting Turkey about the
issue.44 For many in America the Armenian genocide had been the
greatest crime of the war, and the division of the Ottoman Empire to
create an independent republic of Armenia was considered necessary to
protect Armenians from further violence in the future. Accordingly,
President Wilson awarded the Armenians territory in Anatolia for an
independent republic of Armenia in the Treaty of Sèvres, but after
Turkey gained independence the Treaty of Sèvres was annulled by the
Treaty of Lausanne which awarded no territory to Armenians and
effectively eliminated the possibility of an independent Armenia. The
United States Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Lausanne over the
Armenian question, but after the other major powers ratified it the
treaty ultimately prevailed as the final statement on Turkey’s postwar
borders.45 Because the Treaty of Lausanne was signed while the
Cartozian case was pending and it was ratified by the other major
powers shortly after the trial but before Judge Wolverton issued his
opinion in the case, the negotiations for an independent Armenia
during the postwar period and their apparent failure at the time of the
trial provide a critical context for understanding the stakes of the
Cartozian case for the many Armenian refugees who had become
stateless.
Surprisingly, in the midst of this growing doubt regarding the
ability of the major powers to secure an independent nation for
Armenian refugees, the United States Bureau of Naturalization
renewed its challenge to the racial eligibility of Armenians for
naturalization by filing its petition in Cartozian. Because by the time
the case would be decided the Immigration Act of 1924 prohibited any

(hereinafter Dadrian, The Turkish Military Tribunal’s Prosecution); see also The
Turkish Military’s Prosecution, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1919. The Turkish Attorney
General appointed to prosecute the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide in the
Turkish war crimes tribunals after the war himself denounced the crimes against the
Armenians as “crimes against humanity.” See Dadrian, The Turkish Military
Tribunal’s Prosecution, supra, at 43.
44. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 331-47; see also SHAW, supra note 31; Richard
G. Hovannisian, Confronting the Armenian Genocide, in PIONEERS OF GENOCIDE
STUDIES 34 (Samuel Totten & Steven Leonard Jacobs eds., 2002).
45. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 331-47. In 1994, the Soviet Union granted
independence to the current Republic of Armenia which consists of portions of eastern
Armenia annexed by the Soviet Union after World War I.
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alien “ineligible to citizenship” from entering the United States,46 the
case would also ultimately decide Armenian eligibility for
immigration. As a result, the Government’s decision to challenge
Armenian racial eligibility for naturalization at this particularly
vulnerable moment profoundly shocked the Armenian community. The
Armenian weekly review Gotchag later wrote that the case was of
great concern to all Armenians, “rich and poor, educated and
uneducated, big and small,”47 and the Washington Post noted that it
seemed “strange to raise the question of eligibility at this late hour.”48
The move threatened many stateless Armenian refugees not only with
the diplomatic abandonment of efforts to secure an independent
Armenia but simultaneous exclusion by its greatest ally the United
States, a combined set of conditions previously inconceivable to the
Armenian community. It also forced the American Committee for an
Independent Armenia to divide its energies between opposing the
ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne and defending the Cartozian
case.
The Government’s renewed challenge to Armenian racial
eligibility for naturalization was apparently motivated by a desire to
clarify conflicting rulings among lower courts after Armenian
naturalization petitions increased during the postwar period and some
lower courts began to interpret dicta in the United States Supreme
Court’s opinion in United States v. Thind (1923) to indicate that
historical residents of Asia such as the Armenians might be racially
ineligible for naturalization regardless of other factors relevant to their
racial classification. The Bureau of Naturalization’s official policy
when Cartozian was filed was to take no action to question the racial
eligibility of Asians other than the Chinese who were expressly
rendered ineligibile for naturalization by the Chinese Exclusion Act
and the Japanese who had been consistently held ineligible for
naturalization by lower courts and ultimately by the Supreme Court.49
46. See 43 Stat. 153, §§ 13(c), 28(c) (1924).
47. See Craver, supra note 14, at 56; Lothyan, supra note 14, at 272.
48. The Status of Armenians, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1925, at 6.
49. See, e.g., Correspondence from Commissioner of Naturalization Richard
Campbell to the Secretary of Labor dated March 22, 1913, in Records of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States, Record Group 85, Box
1573, File 19783/43, National Archives Building, Washington, DC (confirming the
Bureau of Naturalization’s policy of not “raising the question in any way as to whether
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As discussed above, prior to Cartozian the question of Armenian racial
eligibility had been settled to the satisfaction of the Bureau of
Naturalization by Halladjian, in which a federal district court in
Massachusetts held four Armenian petitioners to be “white” and
therefore racially eligible for naturalization.50 The Bureau of
Naturalization adopted the holding of Halladjian and offered no
objection to Armenian naturalizations until it became apparent that
lower courts had begun to raise their own objections to Armenian
eligibility despite the Bureau’s position.51
After World War I, Armenian refugees began immigrating to the
United States in greater numbers to escape religious persecution and
genocide,52 and between 1920 and the time of the Cartozian trial
Armenian petitions for naturalization had increased by sixty percent
due in part to the Armenian genocide and the desire of many
Armenians to secure passports to return and help loved ones abroad.53
Although the defense in Cartozian argued that the “color line” had
never been drawn against Armenians and that they readily assimilated
with “white” Europeans and Americans, historical evidence suggests
that Armenian immigrants suffered significant racism and xenophobia
in the United States during the early twentieth century. In Fresno,
California, for example, where a substantial Armenian immigrant
community resided, the “white” establishment referred to Armenians
aliens applying for citizenship came within the [racial eligibility] provisions of section
2169” of the Naturalization Act).
50. See In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
51. See, e.g., Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 141 (discussing March 7,
1924 correspondence from Commissioner of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to M.
Vartan Malcolm introduced into evidence during the trial).
52. Significantly, the first statutory protection of refugees was an exception to the
literacy test for immigrants “seeking admission to the United States to avoid religious
persecution in the country of their last permanent residence,” Immigration Act of Feb.
5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874 (1917), a measure particularly designed to protect Armenians and
Russian Jews. In a 1924 habeas corpus proceeding regarding Ossana Soghanalian’s
admission to the United States as an alien fleeing religious persecution and seeking an
exemption under this provision, the record showed that “the Turks killed her father and
mother, and killed or deported all the Christians in Hadjin, that she was seized and kept
in a harem for 3 1/2 years, until she was saved by the Allied armies,” and that she
pleaded that “‘if the government of the United States sends me back, I will throw
myself overboard, as I have no place to go.’” Johnson v. Tertzag, 2 F.2d 40, 41 (1st
Cir. 1924).
53. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 138, 141; see also Craver, supra
note 14, at 56.
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as “Fresno Niggers,” excluded them from churches and social centers,
and prohibited them from owning or leasing land through restrictive
land covenants.54 Armenians were also frequently excluded from
American labor unions because they were regarded as “foreigners.”55
The discrimination Armenians faced in communities like Fresno likely
contributed to the growing questions regarding Armenian whiteness
among lower courts.
These growing racial tensions generated by increased Armenian
immigration were further compounded by the United States Supreme
Court’s opinion in United States v. Thind (1923), in which the Court
commented in dicta that “there is much in the origin and historic
development of the [Naturalization Act] to suggest that no Asiatic
whatever was included” within the scope of the racial prerequisite in
the Act.56 In both Thind and Ozawa v. United States (1922), decided a
mere three months before Thind, the Court rejected scientific
definitions of race as an interpretive index of the meaning of the racial
prerequisites in the Naturalization Act and instead applied what is
commonly referred to as the “ordinary usage” rule of statutory
interpretation, according to which the words of a statute are to be
interpreted according to their ordinary usage or “popular sense” unless
a technical meaning is clearly indicated. Accordingly, the Court held
that the words “white person” in the Naturalization Act should be
interpreted as “words of common speech and not of scientific origin, . .
. written in the common speech, for common understanding, by
unscientific men.”57 The Court reached this holding in specific
54. See MICHAEL BOBELIAN, CHILDREN OF ARMENIA: A FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE AND
CENTURY-LONG STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 110 (2009). Both President Eisenhower
and then Vice President Richard Nixon owned property containing such anti-Armenian
covenants. See id.
55. See M. VARTAN MALCOLM, THE ARMENIANS IN AMERICA 83-126 (Pilgrim
Press, 1919).
56. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214 (1923).
57. Id. at 214. In Thind, Justice Sutherland specifically cites the prior precedent of
Maillard v. Lawrence in applying the ordinary usage rule of statutory interpretation.
See Thind at 214; Maillard v. Lawrence, 57 U.S. 251, 261 (1853) (“If language which
is familiar to all classes and grades and occupations—language, the meaning of which
is impressed upon all by the daily habits and necessities of all, may be wrested from its
established and popular import in reference to the common concerns of life, there can
be little stability or safety in the regulations of society.”). Lower courts also applied
this rule to the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act and such lower court
THE
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response to the growing incidence of lower courts adopting the
ethnographic classification of Caucasian as determinative of the
meaning of the term “white” in the Naturalization Act. By applying the
ordinary usage rule, the Court specifically rejected the ethnographic
classification of Caucasian as an adequate definition of the word
“white” except “in the popular sense of the word” or as it is “popularly
known,” which according to the Court often diverged from its
scientific definition.58
Before the Court’s opinions in Ozawa and Thind, lower courts
had examined numerous historical sources to discover the original
intent of the phrase “white persons” in the minds of the First Congress
and often split over whether the phrase should be interpreted
affirmatively to include only those who the First Congress commonly
considered “white” or negatively as a catch-all term that included
everyone except those people who the First Congress specifically
considered non-“white” (i.e., Africans and American Indians). Many
early racial prerequisite courts reached the latter conclusion.59 Indeed,
this interpretation was supported by numerous historical sources cited
by early racial prerequisite courts but was ultimately rejected by the
Supreme Court in Ozawa based on the conclusion that the affirmative
form of the Naturalization Act and the petitioner’s burden of proof did
not support such a definition:
It may be true that [the African and American Indian]
races were alone thought of as being excluded, but to say
that they were the only ones within the intent of the
precedent was expressly approved in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ozawa. See
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1918). See also In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002,
1003 (D. Or. 1910) (applying the ordinary usage rule to the racial prerequisite in the
Naturalization Act); In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 127 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (same). See
generally G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:
FOUNDED ON THE TREATISE OF SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL 4 (Frederick D. Linn &
Co., 1888).
58. See ENDLICH, supra note 57, at 197; Thind, 261 U.S. at 208-09.
59. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 349 (W.D. Tex. 1897) (“Indeed, it is a
debatable question whether the term ‘free white person,’ as used in the original act of
1790, was not employed for the sole purpose of withholding the right of citizenship
from the black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this country.”). The
petitioners and amici curiae in racial prerequisite cases also frequently argued this and
similar arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1910)
(“Counsel for certain Syrian interveners as amici curiae contend the words ‘free white
persons’ were used simply to exclude slaves and free negroes.”).
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statute would be to ignore the affirmative form of the
legislation. The provision is not that Negroes and
Indians shall be excluded but it is, in effect, that only
free white persons shall be included. The intention was
to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of
persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it
to all who could not be so classified. It is not enough to
say that the framers did not have in mind the brown or
yellow races of Asia. It is necessary to go farther and be
able to say that had these particular races been suggested
the language of the act would have been so varied as to
include them within its privileges.60
In this passage, the Court not only rejects the definition of whiteness as
a catch-all term referring to everyone except those who the First
Congress specifically considered non-“white,” but it assumes that most
or all of the “races of Asia” were “brown or yellow” and not “white”
within the meaning of the Naturalization Act, an erroneous assumption
according to the historical evidence.61
Courts interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Act also
struggled to identify factors that might be used to determine whether
petitioners should be classified as “white” or non-“white” within the
meaning of the Act. Only a fraction of the published judicial opinions
addressing the racial prerequisite were issued before 1909, and with
one exception the opinions in the early cases are brief and primarily
rely on the racial classification systems of the leading ethnological
authorities of the nineteenth century such as Friedrich Blumenbach,
George Buffon, Georges Cuvier, Thomas Huxley, Augustus Keane,
and Carl Linnaeus, particularly the ethnographic classification of
Caucasian which the Court ultimately rejected in Ozawa and Thind.62
60. See Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 195-96. Cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 420 (1857)
(writing that the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act “would seem to have been
used merely because it followed out the line of division which the Constitution has
drawn between the citizen race, who formed and held the Government, and the African
race, which they held in subjection and slavery, and governed at their own pleasure”).
61. For a detailed discussion of early descriptions of Chinese and Japanese people
as “white” by Europeans and Americans, see KEEVAK, supra note 11.
62. See, e.g., In re Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878); In re Saito, 62 F. at 127;
In re Po, 28 N.Y.S. 383 (N.Y. City Ct. 1894); In re Yamashita, 10 P. 482 (Wash.
1902). For a discussion of the scientific evidence of race introduced in the early racial
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As acceptance of racialist science began to decline in the scientific
community after the turn of the twentieth century, however, many
lower courts began to anticipate the conclusion that popular and
scientific meanings of race could not be reconciled and turned to other
means of defining race. Many of these courts openly recognized that
race was socially, culturally, and historically constructed, one court
even finding that “there is no European or white race, as the United
States contends, and no Asiatic or yellow race which includes
substantially all the people of Asia.”63 Some courts also recognized that
whiteness was a highly contingent and negotiable political commodity
and that judicial interpretations of the term “white” in the Act had at
times been both broadened to include groups whose whiteness had
once been unrecognized and narrowed to exclude groups whose
whiteness had not previously been challenged.64
The courts that reached the conclusion that racialist science was
unreliable as a guide to interpreting the racial prerequisite in the
Naturalization Act developed what was referred to as the “geographical
test” of race, described as a commonality of geographical origin, blood,
previous social and political environment, laws, usages, customs, and
traditions, or a closely related test referred to as the “historical
interpretation” of race, best exemplified by the Solicitor General’s
argument that what constitutes a “white person” cannot be “wholly
determined upon either geographical, philological, or ethnological
prerequisite cases, see LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 49-77. One notable exception to this
early trend is In re Rodriguez, in which Judge Thomas Maxey wrote a lengthy opinion
in support of his conclusion that Mexicans were “white.” See In re Rodriguez, 81 F.
337. In Rodriguez, Judge Maxey carefully analyzes the racial classifications of early
census forms and the history of treaties entered into by the United States to support his
conclusion that Mexicans had never previously been classified as non-“white” or been
denied citizenship on the basis of race. Id. at 349. Many early courts also considered
complexion or skin color to determine whether a petitioner was “white” and referenced
skin color as relevant to their conclusions; however, given its variability, the courts
largely rejected the “utter impracticability” of such an index of race standing alone. See
In re Singh, 246 F. 496, 497-98 (E.D. Pa. 1917). The United States Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, for example, admitted a petitioner from Calcutta, India,
whose parents were natives of Afghanistan, finding among other things that “the skin
of his arm where it had been protected from the sun and weather by his clothing was . .
. several shades lighter than that of his face and hands, and was sufficiently transparent
for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly.” United States v. Dolla, 177 F.
101, 102 (5th Cir. 1910).
63. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 845 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909)
64. See, e.g., id.; In re Singh, 246 F. 496, 498-99 (E.D. Pa. 1917).
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bases,” but “can only be determined in the light of history” and
included only “those peoples of the white race who, at the time of the
formation of the government, lived in Europe and were inured to
European governmental institutions, or upon the American continent,”
who, “from tradition, teaching, and environment, would be predisposed
toward our form of government, and thus readily assimilate with the
people of the United States.”65 Courts adopting the “historical
interpretation” of race relied on historical narratives rather than
ethnological authorities to justify their racial classifications, often
referencing authorities as old as the Hebrew and Christian scriptures as
well as various historians, geographers, and travel writers from ancient
Greece through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in lengthy
discussions of the geographical, political, religious, and cultural
histories of various racial groups from central and western Asia to
determine if a particular petitioner was “white.”66
Although the Supreme Court did not expressly adopt the
“historical interpretation” of race in Thind, its adoption of this
interpretation is suggested by the Court’s conclusion that the racial
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act should be interpreted according
to the ordinary or popular sense of racial classifications rather than
scientific definitions of race and by two crucial findings that the
defense directly responded to in Cartozian. The petitioner in Thind was
a “high caste Hindu of full Indian blood” who advanced the IndoEuropean invasion theory of Indian civilization originally developed by
European scholars who concluded that Europeans and Asian Indians
descended from a common “white” ancestor who invaded the Indian
subcontinent prior to India’s Vedic era and conquered the darkskinned
65. Brief for the United States at 20, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)
(No. 202). Cf. In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1003 (D. Or. 1910).
66. See, e.g., In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); In re Mozumdar,
207 F. 115 (E.D. Wash. 1913); Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812 (E.D.S.C. 1913); In re
Dow, 213 F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915); United States v.
Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1944); In re
S–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 104 (B.I.A. 1950); In re R–-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 1951). One
judge even commented on the peculiarity of this form of writing in his opinion, noting
that the lengthy genealogy of racial history in the opinion “may seem wholly out of
place in a reasoned judicial opinion as to the construction of a statute, except as
illustrating the Serbonian bog into which a court or judge will plunge that attempts to
make the words ‘white persons’ conform to any racial classification.” In re Dow, 213
F. 355, 364 (E.D.S.C. 1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915).
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Dravidians of the region. Adding to this theory of Asian Indian origins
another argument that circulated among Indian nationalists, the
petitioner in Thind claimed that high caste Hindus were not only
“white” by virtue of their descent from a premodern “white” ancestor
but that due to the caste restrictions on marriage imposed by Hindu law
they had preserved their racial purity to such an extent that they
enjoyed a racial purity unparalleled even by European and American
whites.67 In its opinion in Thind, the Court first rejects the idea that
descent from “some remote, common ancestor” could determine a
person’s present racial status, stating that “it may be true that the blond
Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim
reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that
there are unmistakable and profound differences between them
today.”68 The Court then adds that although Asian Indians may have
descended from Indo-European invaders of the Indian subcontinent
who were once “white,” their intermarriages with the darkskinned
Dravidians of the subcontinent had rendered contemporary Asian
Indians non-“white” in any ordinary or popular sense of the term. After
dismissing the significance of an Indo-European ancestor, the Court
then adds that contemporary Asian Indians are undoubtedly
inassimilable with life in the United States, writing that while
the children of English, French, German, Italian,
Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly
merge into the mass of our population and lose the
distinctive hallmarks of their European origin, . . . it
cannot be doubted that the children born in this country
of Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear
evidence of their ancestry.69
The Court fails to explain this conclusion but merely asserts it as self67. As Harold R. Isaacs writes, Asian Indians who internalized this theory often
conceived themselves as “more ‘white’ than the ‘whites,’ indeed, as descendants from
that ‘pure Aryan family’ of prehistoric times,” endowing them “with a sort of
Mayflower status in relation to ‘whiteness.’” HAROLD R. ISAACS, IMAGES OF ASIA:
AMERICAN VIEWS OF CHINA AND INDIA 290 (Capricorn Books ed. 1962).
68. Among other arguments offered in support of its opinion in Thind the Court
notes that in 1790 the Adamite theory of creation, according to which all of humanity
descended from a common ancestor, was generally accepted, and as a result any
definition that relied on a remote common ancestor would render the statutory
language meaningless. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 212-15 (1923).
69. Thind, 261 U.S. at 215.
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evident, and consequently while the passage suggests some form of
assimilability test as one means of interpreting the racial prerequisite in
the Naturalization Act it is unclear what test of assimilability the Court
intended.
The Court’s opinion in Thind provides the most immediate
precedent for Cartozian, and because the Court issued its opinions in
Ozawa and Thind less than a year before Cartozian was filed,
Cartozian also provides one of the earliest attempts by lower courts to
interpret these important opinions of the Court regarding the racial
prerequisites in the Naturalization Act. The Court’s opinions in Ozawa
and Thind rejected the argument that contemporary descendants of an
Indo-European ancestor were necessarily “white” within the ordinary
usage of the term absent evidence that they remained assimilable with
contemporary Europeans and the opinions suggested the Court’s
endorsement of the “historical interpretation” of race that had
developed during the previous decades. As discussed further below, the
defense in Cartozian responded directly to these considerations by
seeking to establish that unlike high caste Hindus, Armenians not only
descended from a premodern European ancestor but remained
assimilable with contemporary Europeans despite residing in Asia for
centuries. To accomplish this, the defense embraced the “historical
interpretation” of race and advanced a narrative of a uniquely rigid
racial segregation in Asia Minor as evidenced by their historic
persecution by the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims, a narrative that
invoked the anti-Islamic sentiment of mythic battles between
Christianity and Islam during the Crusades, popular epithets of the
Armenians as the “Christian people of ancient Eden,” the “first people
to embrace Christianity,” and “guides to the Crusaders,”70 and tensions
between the United States and Turkey during the post-World War I era.

THE CARTOZIAN TRIAL: A STORY OF PERSECUTION AND
MARTYRDOM
The transcript of the Cartozian trial preserved by the National
Archives and Records Administration reveals a great deal about the
conflicts and tensions in the case that are not evident in the published

70. KOOLAKIAN, supra note 42, at 23.
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opinion.71 As Robert Ferguson writes, because trial transcripts reflect
complete records of court proceedings in which everything that is said
is spontaneously recorded, they reveal, “as nothing else quite can, the
real preoccupations in the flow of legal argument,” supplying a better
perspective for understanding “the formulation of story that lies at the
center of all courtroom proceedings,” and
if transcripts are decidedly more opaque, less accessible,
and less dramatic than final opinions, they are richer in
the range of commentary that they include, and they tell
us much about the choices made in a final opinion. As
complete records of court proceedings, transcripts
register the conflict in the advocacy system in ways that
a judicial decision ignores in the name of judgment.72
In Cartozian, the transcript reveals the conflicts and tensions that faced
Armenians during the postwar period and the defense’s rhetorical
strategy of creating a powerful sense of social solidarity with
Americans by portraying Turkey as a common enemy through a
historical narrative of Turkish persecution of Armenians culminating in
the Armenian genocide of World War I. The transcript also reveals the
conflict between this rhetorical strategy and Armenians’
protonationalist aspirations, insofar as this strategy depended upon a
negation of Armenian national identity that at times metaphorically
echoed the eliminationist campaign the Armenians had recently
suffered in the war, a conflict that highlights difficult identity issues in
the case not evident in the judicial opinion.
Significantly, correspondence between the lead counsel for the
Armenian defense and the Department of Labor indicates that the
Government repeatedly reassured concerned Armenians that the case

71. Because expert witnesses Paul Rohrbach, Roland Burrage Dixon, James Barton,
and Franz Boas testified by deposition in the case, textual references to the transcript
may alternatively or collectively refer to the transcript of evidence of the two-day
bench trial held on May 8-9, 1924 in Portland, Oregon and to the transcript of expert
depositions held between April 5-9, 1924. The transcript of these expert depositions
was introduced as evidence during the trial and thus constitutes part of the trial record.
The footnote citations identify whether one or both of these transcripts serve as a
source for the textual content.
72. Robert A. Ferguson, Becoming American: High Treason and Low Incentive in
the Republic of Laws, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 103, 103 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., The Univ. of Mich. Press 1994).
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was friendly.73 Apparently as a result, the Government presented
virtually no opposition to Armenian racial eligibility for naturalization
during the trial but rested its case after introducing only a small amount
of documentary evidence and brief testimony regarding reports from
the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the United States
House of Representatives that classified Armenians as originating in
“Turkey in Asia.”74 This stance is consistent with the Department of
Labor’s policy, discussed above, of taking no position on the racial
eligibility of individual naturalization petitioners but merely informing
courts of the petitioner’s race and prior judicial precedent regarding the
eligibility of people classified as belonging to that race. The
Government otherwise relied on the position that the trial court and any
appellate courts reviewing the case could take judicial notice of
“historical, geographical and ethnological matters and works and
authorities” to determine whether Armenians were “white,” a position
with which Judge Wolverton and the defense agreed. Surprising as this
conclusion may sound after decades of confusion regarding the
meaning of the racial prerequisite in the Act, the Government appears
73. See, e.g., Correspondence from M. Vartin Malcolm to Commissioner of
Naturalization Raymond Crist dated Jan. 8, 1924, in Records of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the United States, Record Group 85, Box 1573, File
19783/43, National Archives Building, Washington, DC (writing that “we realize that .
. . the suit commenced by the Government [in Cartozian] is friendly, and on every
level I have heard the expression of the hope that we may and will win . . . .”).
74. The Government introduced several reports of the Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization of the United States House of Representatives showing that
Armenian immigration was categorized as originating from “Turkey in Asia,” George
Washington’s statement in his Farewell Address to the American people that “with
slight shades of difference, you have the same Religion, Manners, Habits, and political
principles,” and a statement from John Quincy Adams’s writings expressing the
expansionist doctrine of “manifest destiny,” writing that “the whole continent of North
America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one nation,
speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political
principles, and accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs.” See
Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 4 (referencing George Washington’s “The
Farewell Advice of the Father of His Country” and John Quincy Adams’s “One Nation
in North America”). The Government’s attorneys did not state what they found
significant about these items, but they appear to support the Government’s argument
that the racial prerequisite to naturalization was only intended to include Western
Europeans, who from tradition, teaching, and environment would be predisposed
toward the American form of government and readily assimilate with the American
people.
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to have taken the position that because the Supreme Court had
effectively adopted the “historical interpretation” of race in Thind and
the trial court could take judicial notice of historical facts, racial
classification no longer required formal proof.75 Importantly, this
position would have rendered the trial unnecessary, and although Judge
Wolverton initially agreed that he would likely want to look at
materials on racial classification outside of the record, he eventually
declined to do so as reflected in a statement toward the end of his
judicial opinion that “I have confined my investigation to the testimony
in the record, and have made no attempt at independent investigation
respecting race, color, assimilation, or amalgamation.”76 Thus, because
the Government presented almost no evidence in the case and Judge
Wolverton declined to take judicial notice of facts outside the record,
the arguments and evidence presented by the Armenian defense
provide the sole record from which the case was decided.
The defense presented a tripartite case for Armenian whiteness
within the meaning of the Naturalization Act: (1) Armenians
descended from Indo-European ancestors who originated in Europe
and migrated to Asia Minor in the seventh century B.C.E. in one of the
many Indo-European invasions of central Asia, (2) unlike descendants
of the Indo-European invaders of the Indian subcontinent who were
rejected as non-“white” in Thind because they had intermarried with
the darkskinned Dravidians of the subcontinent, Armenians had
remained “white” due to a unique geographical, linguistic, and
religious isolation in Asia Minor, and (3) Armenians readily
assimilated with contemporary Europeans and Americans as evidenced
by their Christianity, their proximity to the people of the Russian
Caucasus region who were the original inspiration for the Caucasian
racial classification, and numerous marriages of Armenians to
Europeans and Americans. Because Armenians claimed whiteness
through one of the many Indo-European invasions of central Asia like
75. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 8. Judicial notice allows courts
to rely on the existence and truth of facts without the necessity of formal proof only
when they are “universally regarded as established by common notoriety, e.g., the laws
of the state, international law, historical events, the constitution and course of nature,
main geographical features, etc.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990)
(sub verbo “judicial notice”); see also A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 485
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 2d ed. 1995) (sub verbo “judicial notice; judicial cognizance”).
76. United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 922 (D. Or. 1925). See also Cartozian
Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 1-5.
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the Asian Indian petitioner had in Thind, the greatest challenge for the
defense was to distinguish their case from that of high caste Hindus
which had been rejected in Thind. The defense primarily sought to
accomplish this by first claiming that Armenians had remained isolated
in Asia Minor due to their inassimilability with the Turks, Kurds, and
Syrian Muslims of the region. To establish this the defense advanced a
historical narrative that featured these Islamic groups as persecutors of
the Armenian Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire and as
perpetrators of the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s and the Armenian
genocide of World War I, leaving the Armenians a displaced people
who would become stateless if they were held ineligible for American
citizenship. Second, the defense claimed that in contrast to their
inassimilability with these groups Armenians were completely
assimilable with contemporary Europeans and Americans.
The argument that Armenians descended from a remodern
“white” ancestor who originated in Europe and migrated to Asia Minor
in the seventh century B.C.E. reflected what was known at the time as
the “classical hypothesis” of Armenian origins. The defense supported
this claim through the expert testimony of Columbia University
anthropologist Franz Boas, Harvard ethnologist Roland Dixon, and M.
Vartan Malcolm, author of The Armenians in America. These experts
collectively cited a host of anthropological, archaeological,
philological, geographical, historical, and travel authorities, beginning
with the fifth century B.C.E. Greek historian Herodotus’s Histories and
the first century B.C.E. Greek geographer Strabo’s Geography, to
support the conclusion that Armenians descended from Phrygian
colonists who migrated to Asia Minor from Europe and belonged to the
Alpine subdivision of the Caucasian race.77 Significantly, although this
77. The works cited include: Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety
of Mankind (M.D. thesis, University of Göttingen, first published in 1776); Friedrich
Braun, The Aboriginal Population of Europe and the Origin of the Teutonic People;
DANIEL BRINTON, RACES AND PEOPLES: LECTURES OF THE SCIENCE OF ETHNOGRAPHY
(1890); ROLAND DIXON, THE RACIAL HISTORY OF MAN (1923); WYNFRID DUCKWORTH,
STUDIES FROM THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL LABORATORY (1904); LOUIS FIGUIER, LES
RACES HUMAINES (1873); MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1916);
ALFRED HADDON, THE RACES OF MAN AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION (1909); JEAN BAPTISTE
JULIEN D’OMALIUS D’HALLOY, DES RACES HUMAINES OU ELÉMENTS D’ ETHNOGRAPHIE
(1845); JOHANN HEINRICH HÜBSCHMANN, ARMENISCHE STUDIEN (1883); Paul
Kretschmer, Der nationale Name der Armenier Haik (1932); FELIX VON LUSCHAN, THE
EARLY INHABITANTS OF WESTERN ASIA (1911); HENRY LYNCH, ARMENIA: TRAVELS
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was the prevailing hypothesis of Armenian origins at the time, the
defense exaggerated the reliability of the hypothesis, the racial
homogeneity it reflected, and the marginality of competing hypotheses.
The history of Armenian origins in Strabo’s Geography is not only
laden with mythology but claims that Armenia was founded by the
consolidation of a host of heterogeneous people from central and
western Asia.78 Moreover, in M. Vartan Malcolm’s book The
Armenians in America, written less than a decade before the trial,
Malcolm acknowledges that some scholars identified the Armenians
with the non-Aryan Hittites of the Bible.79 In one noteworthy example
of the latter hypothesis, Mardiros Ananikian argues in the Mythology of
All Races published at nearly the same time as the trial that the original
inhabitants of the Armenian plateau, known as the Urartrians, belonged
to the same non-Aryan and non-Semitic peoples as the Hittites.80
AND STUDIES (1901); JACQUES DE MORGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE:
FROM THE REMOTEST TIMES TO PRESENT DAY (1918); WILLIAM RIPLEY, RACES OF

EUROPE (1899); OTTO SCHRADER, PREHISTORIC ANTIQUITIES OF THE ARYAN PEOPLES: A
MANUAL OF COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AND THE EARLIEST CULTURE (1890); and
GIUSEPPE SERGI, MAN, HIS ORIGIN, ANTIQUITY, VARIETY AND GEOGRAPHICAL
DISTRIBUTION. See Transcript of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Roland Burrage Dixon, Dr. James
L. Barton, and Dr. Franz Boas Deposition, United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D.
Or. 1925) (No. E-8668), in Significant Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925,
District of Oregon (Portland), Records of U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group
118, National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle,
Wash. [hereinafter Cartozian Deposition Transcript]; Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra
note 1, at 101, 128-29.
78. In the same chapter of The Geography that the defense cites, Strabo reports that
the Armenians descended from Jason and Medea, a reference to the epic myth by
which Jason, who was raised by a centaur, led the Greek Argonauts on a quest for the
Golden Fleece which was guarded by a dragon that never slept. See STRABO, THE
GEOGRAPHY OF STRABO 269 (H.C. Hamilton & W. Falconer trans., G. Bell & Sons,
Ltd. 1913). Strabo also writes that the ancient origin of Armenia derives from Armenus
of Armenium, who accompanied Jason in his expedition into Armenia, and that the
Jasonia serve as proof of Jason’s expedition. See id. at 272; cf. THE READER’S
ENCYCLOPEDIA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD LITERATURE AND THE ARTS 45, 555, 707
(William Rose Benét ed., 1948). In addition to these mythic origins of the Armenians,
Strabo notes in The Geography that Armenia was originally a small country enlarged
by the conquest of surrounding areas, consolidating under one language an array of
heterogeneous peoples. See STRABO, supra note 78, at 269, 273-74.
79. See MALCOLM, supra note 55, at 49.
80. See MARDIROS H. ANANIKIAN, THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES 7-8 (Canon
John Arnott MacCulloch ed., 1925). According to Ananikian, the Armenians
conquered the Urartians and reduced many to serfdom, imposing on them the
Armenian name, language, religion, and civilization, such that “it is very natural that

2012] PERSECUTORY AGENCY IN THE RACIAL PREREQUISITE CASES

149

Nevertheless, the “classical hypothesis” that Armenians descended
from Indo-Europeans who migrated to Asia Minor from Europe was
the prevailing theory of Armenian origins and endorsed by numerous
authorities.81
The defense then claimed that despite residing in Asia Minor for
centuries, Armenians had remained “white” due to their religious
isolation which had “preserved their individuality, their religion, and
their national characteristics, as against the conquering Turks, more
than probably any other people.”82 Harvard ethnologist Roland Dixon
testified, for example, that the Armenians had maintained a remarkable
homogeneity despite tremendous pressure from the Turks and other
conquerors of the region, who were presumably racially Asian in
origin:
The Armenians retained their nationality and national
characteristics against the tremendous pressure brought
to bear upon them by these conquerors for many
centuries. They were practically the first nation to be
converted to Christianity, and they have retained their
faith in the face of tremendous odds from the early
fourth century to the present time.83
Similarly, the defense asked Franz Boas to read the following
such a relation should culminate in a certain amount of fusion between the two races.”
Id.
81. In In re Halladjian, Judge Lowell probably offered the most accurate conclusion
regarding Armenian racial origins, writing that like Europeans “the present inhabitants
of western Asia have their racial descent so mixed that there are many individuals who
cannot safely be assigned by descent to any one race, however comprehensive.” 174 F.
834, 837-38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). Judge Lowell also wrote:
Only where a people has remained without considerable emigration
or immigration, substantially unmixed, in the same country for a very
long time, do racial and geographical boundaries coincide. The
inhabitants of no considerable part of Europe belong to a race thus
unmixed. In what is called by analogy a “mixed race,” the cross must
have been ancient, and the hybrid must have persisted without much
later crossing. In nearly all Europe the mixture is not only ancient,
but has continued to modern times, and even to the present day.
Id. For an excellent study of how historians rhetorically constructed a single AngloSaxon race out of a heterogeneity of races in Britain, see COHEN, supra note 25.
82. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 36; Cartozian Trial
Transcript, supra note 1, at 103.
83. Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 35.
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translated excerpt from Felix von Luschan’s work Die Tachtadschy, in
which von Luschan wrote that the racial homogeneity of Armenians
was unparalleled anywhere in the worldT
the homogeneity of this people which is not found in
equal or similar degree in any other civilized nation, is
interesting because it shows that owing to the striking
geographical, linguistic and religious isolation of
Armenia during its development and florescence, the
type has remained pure and has been consolidated to
such an extent that even today, many centuries after the
fall of the empire, it has remained almost entirely
uniform.84
Several witnesses also denied they knew of even a single instance
when an Armenian married a Muslim or converted to Islam other than
by forced conversion.85 When one witness was asked if he had ever
known of any marriages between the Armenian race and the Turks or
the Kurds, he replied, “I have never heard of it,” and when another was
pressed on cross-examination regarding whether or not there were
some Armenian Muslims he replied adamantly, “not one.”86 In this
testimony and elsewhere in the trial transcript, the defense argued that
unlike the Asian Indians of the Indian subcontinent, Armenians had
retained their original “white” racial identity through the centuries due
to a unique geographical, linguistic, and religious isolation.
The defense claimed that this unparalleled isolation and racial
purity was due to the inassimilability of Armenians with their Islamic
neighbors as evidenced by a history of violent religious persecution
suffered by the Armenians since their conquest by the Ottoman Turks,
ultimately culminating in the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s and the
Armenian genocide of World War I. This argument invoked deep
historic prejudices between Christianity and Islam, which remain
evident in the United States during the post-9/11 era87 but which were
also a particularly powerful source of American identification with

84. Id. at 82; Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 103.
85. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 14-15, 17-18, 51-53, 66.
86. Id. at 17, 52. Similarly, Mrs. Floyd Lamson testified that she had never known
of an Armenian woman who had married a Muslim. Id. at 66.
87. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 17, at 51-54; SALAH D. HASSAN, Arabs, Race and
the Post-September 11 National Security State in MIDDLE EAST REPORT 224, 16-21
(2002).
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Armenians during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
When American missionaries began arriving in the Ottoman Empire
and establishing Christian missionaries and schools in the midnineteenth century, the Christian communities in the United States
developed a powerful religious identification with Armenians. As
Judge Francis Cabot Lowell notes in Halladjian, in the European
imagination Armenia was “continuously associated with the place and
landscape of the Bible,” particularly Armenia’s national symbol,
Mount Ararat, the site of God’s covenant with Noah in the biblical
book of Genesis and located in Armenia by Renaissance
cartographers.88 Recognizing this mythic power of Armenia in midnineteenth century America, Walt Whitman wrote in his poem to the
peoples of the world, “Salut au Monde,” in Leaves of Grass,
You thoughtful Armenian pondering by some stream of the
Euphrates! You peering amid the ruins of Nineveh!
You ascending Mt. Ararat!89
The Hamidian massacres of the 1890s were widely published in
American headlines and had a profound impact on the American
public, even prompting debate about military intervention in the region
before the turn of the century.90 In part as a result of the sympathy
generated by these massacres, the early twentieth century became an
era of popular epithets about the Armenians, referring to them as the
“Christian people of ancient Eden,” the “first people to embrace
Christianity,” and “guides to the Crusaders.”91 The Armenians were
also frequently called “the starving Armenians” in recognition of the

88. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). Renaissance
cartographers located the Garden of Eden and other sacred sites of biblical literature in
or near Armenia. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 29-30. The Caucasian racial
classification had also long centered around hypotheses about the location of Mount
Ararat and the subsequent spread of Noah’s progeny. See KEEVAK, supra note 11, at
74, 80.
89. WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 146 (Harold W. Blodgett & Sculley
Bradley eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1965).
90. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at xix, 4, 10-11, 66-67, 207, 282-85, 345. On
September 10, 1895, for example, decades before the Holocaust of World War II, a
New York Times headline described the persecution the Armenians suffered during the
Hamidian massacres as “Another Armenian Holocaust.” See Another Armenian
Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, September 10, 1895.
91. KOOLAKIAN, supra note 42, at 23.
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starvation that flowed from their treatment in the Ottoman Empire, and
after a grassroots charity drive spread news of the Armenian genocide
through this epithet, American children were often told to remember
“the starving Armenians” when admonished to clean their plates.92 As
President Herbert Hoover would later comment of the era, “the name
Armenia was in the front of the American mind” and “known to the
American schoolchild only a little less than England.”93
As a result of this powerful identification with Armenians,
Americans were deeply shocked by the Armenian genocide of World
War I and the politics of denial that followed. In the immediate
postwar period, numerous books and films about the genocide
proliferated in the United States and worldwide. Most notably, in 1918,
Henry Morgenthau’s memoirs of his service as American ambassador
to Turkey were published under the title Ambassador Morgenthau’s
Story to wide critical acclaim,94 including a lengthy chapter entitled
“The Murder of a Nation” that recounts the horrific details of the
Armenian genocide which Morganthau describes as “one of the most
hideous chapters of modern history,”95 lamenting that “the whole
history of the human race contains no such horrible episode.”96 The
same year Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story was published, the epic
drama of Aurora Mardiganian’s struggle to survive her forced march
across Anatolia was published as a book and adapted to silent film
under the title Ravished Armenia, depicting the terror of genocide on
the screen for the first time.97 Through these and other cultural
representations of the Armenian genocide that proliferated in the
postwar era, the shock and trauma of the events was still fresh in the
American mind at the time of the Cartozian trial.
Although the events are not specifically referenced in the judicial
opinion in Cartozian, the trial transcript reveals that the Hamidian
massacres of the 1890s and the more recent Armenian genocide of
World War I were frequently discussed during the trial. Two Armenian

92. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 75, 291.
93. HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: YEARS OF ADVENTURE
1874-1920, at 385 (The MacMillan Co. 1951).
94. See HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU’S STORY 301-25
(1918).
95. Id. at 305.
96. Id. at 322.
97. BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 314-17.
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witnesses testified that they and their parents had escaped from Turkey
during the Hamidian massacres to seek refuge in the United States,98
M. Vartan Malcolm testified that Armenians came to the United States
in larger numbers during the 1890s because of the sympathy that the
American missionaries showed to them, noting that “from that time on
these people have come here because of their religious persecution by
the Turks and because they found friends among the American
missionaries in Turkey,”99 and Malcolm testified that the reason for the
dramatic increase in Armenian applications for naturalization in the
United States since 1920 was that Armenians, particularly bachelors
“whose parents have been driven out of their home land through the
last Turkish massacres and the war needed a passport and other
protections to go back and find their lost loved ones.”100 In addition,
James Barton, foreign secretary of the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions who headed the relief expedition
in Turkey after World War I, referenced the Turkish deportations of
Armenians during the war.101 The end of M. Vartan Malcolm’s
testimony on the first day of the trial he explained to Judge Wolverton
that although President Wilson had awarded Armenia territory for an
independent republic of Armenia in the Treaty of Sèvres it no longer
existed and “today the entire Armenian people are scattered all over the
Near East, and the possibility of Armenians going back to the old
country is absolutely dead.”102 When Judge Wolverton asked him if the
Armenians had any governmental organization in Turkey, Malcolm
explained, “we have no Armenia, your Honor,” “there is no Armenia
now,” adding,
I must state that we lost a million Armenians during the
war. There were before the war four million Armenians
in all the world. We lost one quarter of the entire
population. No other nation has lost so many as the
Armenians. And there are now in all the world about two
and a half million Armenians, and most of them are in
the Caucasus. They took refuge there in order to save
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 19, 56-57.
Id. at 101-04.
Id. at 138.
See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 46.
Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 153-54.
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themselves.103
When asked if Syria was more populated than Armenia, another
witness responded “well, certainly, because the Armenians have been
decimated in their numbers, and scattered broadcast.”104 The defense
emphasized that as a consequence of these conditions, if their
citizenship were denied or revoked the Armenian refugees would be a
stateless people, a “people without a country.”105
The defense also specifically represented the Armenians as
religious martyrs who suffered Turkish persecution because they would
not recant their Christian faith,106 often reiterating the claim that the
Armenians were “the oldest Christian nation” and had remained devout
in their Christian faith through the centuries.107 Numerous witnesses
testified to the positions of Armenians in Christian churches in
Armenia, Europe, and America, including a number of witnesses who
were ministers, pastors, or Sunday school teachers, and the defense’s
tabulation of hundreds of responses to a questionnaire distributed to
Armenian American men lists detailed Christian affiliations for most of
the respondents.108 Paul Rohrbach testified of how Armenians in
103. Id. at 155.
104. Id. at 18. Likewise, after being asked if the Syrians had not suffered similar
treatment, M.B. Parounagian testified that only one part of Syria had suffered similar
persecution but “only I know about the Armenian race and their persecution, their
sufferings.” Id. As indicated in the epigraph at the beginning of this article, this witness
also testified that Armenians never married Turks unless it was “by force” and
Armenians never adopted Islam except “for force, perhaps, they have been made,
during the massacres, to save their lives.” Id. at 17-18.
105. Because an Armenian who left Turkey forfeited his personal and property rights
and the Turkish government would not issue a passport to him, he would be unable to
travel without an American passport. See, e.g., Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note
1, at 68, 130-31. As one witness testified, “we are a people with no country, and it is a
great privilege for every Armenian to call America as their own country.” Id. at 72.
106. This was a familiar narrative regarding Armenian history in the Ottoman
Empire. In an article published in The New Armenia shortly before Cartozian, for
example, Herbert Lee wrote that “when . . . we remember that these [Armenians] were
slain because they would not deny Christ, may we not assert that here is the supreme
call to every Christian in the world?” Herbert Powell Lee, Armenia as the Measure of
Our Civilization, THE NEW ARMENIA, Sept.-Oct. 1921, at 67-69; cf. KENNETH BURKE,
A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 222 (1950) (“Martyrdom [bearing witness] is so essentially
rhetorical, it even gets its name from the law courts.”).
107. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 14.
108. See id. at 11-12, 20-21, 38-40, 42, 44-46, 56, 62, 81, 84, 89, 98, 114, 117, 166.
See also Defendant’s Exhibit listing “names, addresses, occupations, the maiden name
of those that are married, citizenship, membership and affiliation with native American
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Venice and Vienna belonged to the Armenian church, described as “a
very old branch of Christendom,” even detailing how the Armenian
monasteries in Venice and Vienna had “very large libraries and a very
noted printing office” used for “the most difficult printing work in the
eastern language of Europe,”109 and James Barton testified that the
Armenians were “pastors of our churches” and everywhere
“recognized as a Christian race.”110 The defense also emphasized that
Armenians retained their Christian faith by withstanding “the onslaught
of Mohammedanism,” or as Roland Dixon testified, “against
fraternal, educational, religious, and social institutions, of 339 persons of Armenian
parentage, now residing in all parts of the United States, and who are engaged in
business and in some professions,” United States v. Cartozian, No. E-8668 (D. Or.), in
Significant Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925, District of Oregon (Portland),
Records of U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group 118, National Archives and
Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, Wash. [hereinafter Cartozian
Tabulation Exhibit].
109. Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 12-13.
110. Id. at 54-55. The defense’s reliance on Armenian Christianity as evidence of
whiteness follows a frequent theme among racial prerequisite cases during the early
twentieth century of associating whiteness with Christianity. See, e.g., United States v.
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213 (1923) (using the biblical allusion “bone of their bone and
flesh of their flesh” to describe those European immigrants who the First Congress
intended by the phrase “white persons”); In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1909) (noting that “by reason of their Christianity, [Armenians] generally ranged
themselves against the Persian fire-worshipers, and against the Mohammedans, both
Saracens and Turks,” that when the Armenians were conquered by the Saracens in the
seventh century they recovered their independence in the ninth century under princes
who they claimed “were of the lineage of David,” and that when the Armenians were
finally conquered in Armenia by the Turks, their refugees set up an independent state
in Cilicia “streaming the ensign of the Christian cross against black pagans, Turks, and
Saracens”); In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1003 (D. Or. 1910) (noting that a Syrian petitioner
was “reared a Catholic, and is still of that faith”); In re Dow, 213 F. 355, 364 (E.D.S.C.
1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915) (writing that the modern inhabitant of the
Lebanon District of Syria in which a Syrian petitioner was born was not the location
either of the Old Testament or “the labors of Christ”); In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843,
845 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (canceling the naturalization certificate of an Arab petitioner
based on the conclusion that Arabs were “part of the Mohammedan world and that a
wide gulf separates their culture from that of the predominately Christian peoples of
Europe”). Of course, the association of whiteness and Christianity also has a long
history in Western imperialism. See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 212.; RUBIN
FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL
ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893-1946, at 39 (1st ed. 1972); ROBERT
A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 14-15, 21, 46-47 (1990).
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tremendous pressure” and “in the face of tremendous odds” due to their
persecution by the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims of Asia Minor.111
Finally, in even more explicit terms the defense appealed to antiIslamic sentiment by explicitly framing Armenian Christianity as
superior to the Islamic faith of the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims
of Asia Minor. The attorneys for the Armenian defense repeatedly
exploited the epithet of Armenians as “guides to the crusaders” by
asking witnesses what effect the Crusades had on the Armenians,112
and one witness attributed the downfall of the last kingdom of Armenia
to the fact that “Armenians had given all of their men protectors and a
great deal of the resources of their country” to the European
crusaders.113 Other witnesses testified that “the social conception of
Mohammedans is that a woman is a chattel; the Christian conception of
a woman is that she is the equal of the man,” that unlike the monogamy
practiced by Armenians “the Mohammedan is permitted to have four
wives, legal wives, and as many concubines as his pocketbook will
permit,” and that Armenians and Christian civilization were “entirely
superior to the Mohammedan faith” and “superior to the Mohammedan
ideals.”114
The defense’s representation of Islam as an inferior religion and
its association of Christianity with whiteness and Islam with “black
pagans, Turks, and Saracens”115 is disturbing on many levels, but
111. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 126-27; Cartozian Deposition
Transcript, supra note 77, at 35.
112. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 36, 88.
113. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 67.
114. See MALCOLM, supra note 55, at 14, 51-52, 137. M. Vartan Malcolm claimed
that Syrians did not have the word “home” in their language because a Syrian
Muslim’s wife and children did not dwell with him, but were kept apart. Id. at 137. The
Armenian defense also argued in their brief that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Thind
suggesting that “no Asiatic whatever” may be eligible for naturalization was based in
large part on the congressional debates regarding the Naturalization Act in 1870 and
1875 in which congressmen opposed to removing the racial prerequisite from the Act
emphasized their concern that the Chinese, whom they sought to exclude, were a
“pagan people.” The Armenian defense argued that the 1870 and 1875 debates,
however, suggested “no intention whatever to exclude the Armenians, a Christian
people living in Asia Minor.” See Brief for Defendant at 14-20, United States v.
Cartozian, 6 F. 2d 919 (D. Or. 1925) (No. E-8668), in Civil and Criminal Case Files,
District of Oregon (Portland), Records of the District Courts of the United States,
Record Group 21, National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Alaska
Region, Seattle, Wash.
115. See Richard II, supra note 30; In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. Mass.
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particularly when considered in light of the fact that Armenian efforts
to achieve a “white” status by representing Turks, Kurds, and Syrian
Muslims as non-“white” for purposes of naturalization was a dubious
legal conclusion at the time. Although the Supreme Court’s dicta in
Thind that “no Asiatic whatever” might be racially eligible for
naturalization provided an opportunity for litigants to advocate that
certain groups from the Middle East were racially ineligible for
naturalization, most authorities had held that Turks, Syrians, and Arabs
were “white” within the meaning of the Naturalization Act and
continued to until the racial prerequisites were repealed in 1952.116 In
1909).
116. Although John Tehranian argues that in the history of the racial prerequisite
cases only “occasionally, and by the slimmest of margins, [were] Middle Easterners . .
. considered white,” this conclusion references only the published judicial opinions in
the cases and is debatable even with reference to those. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 17,
at 49. There is ample evidence that Middle Easterners were more frequently considered
“white” within the meaning of the Naturalization Act, and the Bureau of Naturalization
had an official policy of not opposing the naturalization of Arabs and other petitioners
from the Middle East almost from the inception of the Bureau in the first decade of the
twentieth century. See, e.g., When “White” Is Not White, THE STATE, Oct. 20, 1909
(reporting that a number of Turks employed in Indiana factories had been naturalized);
“Free Whites” From Turkey, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1909 (reporting that Judge Arthur
L. Brown of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island admitted
Jacob Thompson, a “subject of the Sultan of Turkey and a native of Armenia,” to
citizenship over the government’s objection, stating that “it has been the practice of
this court for many years to recognize Armenians and Turks as coming within the
designation of free white persons, and the court will continue so to consider them until
a court of higher authority decides otherwise”); Internal Correspondence from the
Acting Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor to Messrs. O’Brien, et al.
dated Nov. 15, 1909, in Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the
United States, Record Group 85, Box 1573, File 19783/43, National Archives
Building, Washington, DC (reporting that “the records of the Department show but
three cases in which courts have held Syrians are not white persons” and including a
table of the cases); In re Najour, 174 F. 735 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909) (holding that a Syrian
“from Mt. Lebanon, near Beirut” was a “white person”); Correspondence from
Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor Charles Nagel to Secretary of
State Philander Knox dated Dec. 7, 1909, in Records of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the United States, Record Group 85, Box 1573, File
19783/43, National Archives Building, Washington, DC (writing that “neither the
Department [of Commerce and Labor] nor the Division of Naturalization has requested
that appeals be taken in any of the cases” in which Syrians applicants had been held to
be “white” and therefore racially eligible for naturalization); In re Halladjian, 174 F. at
845 (noting prior naturalizations of Armenians “as well as Syrians and Turks,” who
had all been “freely naturaliz[ed] in this court until now”); In re Mudarri, 176 F. 465
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1909, after the Chief of the Naturalization Division of the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization claimed that “Turks, peoples of the
Barbary states and Egypt, Persians, Syrians, and ‘other Asiatics’” were
not “white” in statements restrictively interpreting the racial
prerequisite to naturalization, the interpretation was almost
immediately withdrawn after it met with vigorous objection not only
from the Ottoman Empire but from the State Department and the
Department of Justice, and Secretary of Commerce and Labor Charles
Nagel later wrote in correspondence that he had taken immediate steps
to ensure “a discontinuance of any aggressive measures” by the
Government against these groups.117 Similarly, after a federal district
court canceled the naturalization certificate of an Arab petitioner in
1942 based on the conclusion that Arabs were “part of the
(C.D. Mass. 1910) (holding that a Syrian “born in Damascus” was a “white person”);
In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002 (D. Or. 1910) (holding that a Syrian who was “a native of the
province of Palestine” and “a Turkish subject” was a “white person”) (cited with
approval in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922)); Dow v. United States,
226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915) (holding that a Syrian was a “white person” and that “a
large number of Syrians have been naturalized without question,” reversing Ex Parte
Dow, 211 F. 486 (E.D.S.C. 1914) and In re Dow, 213 F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914) (on
rehearing)), In re Sallak, No. 14876 (N.D. Ill., East. Div., June 27, 1924), in
Significant Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925, District of Oregon (Portland),
Records of U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group 118, National Archives and
Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region (holding that a petitioner “born in
Palestine” was a “white person”); In re S–-, 1 I & N Dec. 174 (B.I.A. 1941) (holding
that a native and citizen of Iraq, whose parents were “full-blooded Arabians” and
whose ancestors “came from Turkish stock” was a “white person”); INS, The
Eligibility of Arabs for Naturalization, MONTHLY REV., October 1943, at 12, 12-16
(concluding that persons of “the Arabian race” are “white persons”); INS, Summaries
of Recent Court Decisions, MONTHLY REV., Jan. 1944, at 12 (reporting a January 13,
1944 ruling of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
that “an Arab born in Beit Hanina, Palestine” was a “white person”); In re Shaikhaly,
Nat. Case No. 119332 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1944), in Folder 119332, Contested
Naturalizations, Southern District of California, Central Division (Los Angeles),
National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Region (holding that “a native
and citizen of Palestine . . . of the Arabian race,” was a “white person”); In re K–-, 2 I
& N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 1945) (holding that a native and citizen of Afghanistan, “of the
Afghan race,” was a “white person”).
117. Correspondence from Charles Nagel to Justin S. Kirreh dated November 13,
1909, in Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States,
Record Group 85, Box 1573, File 19783/43, National Archives Building, Washington,
DC; see Aliens Refused Naturalization, supra note 31; Turkey Will Protest, supra note
31; A. Rustem Bey, supra note 31; Race Row Up To Courts, supra note 31; Conflicting
Views Taken of Asiatic Exclusion, supra note 31; Way Paved for Syrians, GRAND
FORKS DAILY HERALD, Dec. 15, 1909.
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Mohammedan world and . . . a wide gulf separates their culture from
that of the predominately Christian peoples of Europe,” both the
Bureau of Naturalization and later courts quickly repudiated the
decision, noting that it had long been the administrative policy of the
United States not to object to Arab naturalizations.118 In Halladjian,
Judge Lowell forcefully rejected the Government’s claim that “the
Turks have never commingled with Europeans, nor can it be said with
any truth that they are descendants of Europeans,” noting instead that
“for many centuries the Turks have ruled in Europe and Asia over
Christians of many names, and have employed Christians for many
purposes,” and that “the Turks, indeed, both socially and sexually,
commingled with Europeans to an unusual degree.”119 Furthermore,
President Wilson formally recognized Syrian American citizenship
when he signed a presidential proclamation encouraging Americans to
make donations to the American Red Cross to help Armenians and
Syrians stricken during World War I, writing in his proclamation that
“thousands of citizens of the United States in practically every State of
the Union were either born in Syria or are the children of Syrians born
in that country.”120 As these sources reflect, the majority of both
executive and judicial authorities concluded that Middle Easterners
were “white” and therefore eligible for naturalization, a fact neither the
Armenian defense nor the Government addressed during the Cartozian
trial. Instead, the Armenian defense simply adopted the useful fiction
that Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims were not “white” and were
therefore racially ineligible for naturalization as a foil against which to
establish Armenian whiteness by virtue of the segregation of these
respective groups in Asia Minor.
This fiction raises a number of difficult questions about the
defense in Cartozian, the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act,
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the racial prerequisite in
Ozawa and Thind. If the Armenians were as inassimilable with Turks,
Kurds, and Syrian Muslims as they claimed and these groups were also
118. Compare In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1942), with In re S–-,
1 I & N Dec. 174 (B.I.A. 1941), The Eligibility of Arabs for Naturalization, supra note
116, at 16, and Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944).
119. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 839 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
120. Proclamation No. 1345, Contribution Days for Aid of Stricken Syrian and
Armenian Peoples (Aug. 31, 1916), reprinted in KOOLAKIAN, supra note 42, at 130-32.
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“white” and eligible for naturalized citizenship, not to mention
birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, did the
defense actually prove that Armenians were inassimilable with early
twentieth century America? The defense’s central premise was that
Christianity determined not only their assimilability with Western
whites but their inassimilability with Asian racial groups through an
indissoluble link between whiteness and Christianity, and the defense
frequently heralded the claim that Armenia was the first nation to make
Christianity a national religion. The First Amendment prohibits the
establishment of a national religion in the United States, however, and
although Christianity has been a dominant strain in American religious
history since the nation’s earliest beginnings, American religious life
was significantly more diverse by the early twentieth century.121 As
mentioned earlier, numerous courts held that petitioners from Islamic,
Zoroastrian, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist religious backgrounds were
“white” and therefore eligible for naturalized citizenship, not to
mention the children born to these and other religious groups who
became citizens by birth under the Fourteenth Amendment.
By emphasizing an indissoluble link between whiteness and
Christianity in their effort to establish that they were not truly “Asian,”
the defense ironically cast doubt on Armenian assimilability with nonChristian whites in the United States. This problem also extends to the
defense’s reliance on the prospect of Armenian statelessness to create
sympathy for their cause. Could the Allied abandonment of Armenian
aspirations for an independent nation have signified the conclusion that
Armenians did not truly belong to the West? One writer complained
that “instead of extending protection to Armenia as to all of the other
Allied nations, the Allies abandoned Armenia to her enemies” after
World War I, and that American Christians were washing their hands
of the Armenian suffering because “they, and the enemies of Armenia,
denounce a Union of Church and State.”122 The defense’s effort to
create a religious identification with American Christians had already
failed during the postwar negotiations for an independent republic of
Armenia for reasons that could have also doomed their claim of racial
eligibility for naturalization in the United States.
In addition, although the rhetorical strategy of the defense
121. See generally, e.g., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY 52-53
(Edward L. Queen II et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
122. Lee, supra note 106, at 69.
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succeeded in securing a favorable ruling in the case it also reflects what
Kenneth Burke calls the “paradox of purity” or the “paradox of the
absolute,” implicit in “any term for a collective motivation, such as a
class, nation, the ‘general will,’ and the like,” where the collective
motive only becomes a “pure” by negating any individual motive.123
The defense could only prove that Armenians had retained their racial
“purity” despite residing in Asia for centuries by establishing that they
had remained in a state of proportionately “pure” isolation from the
Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims. The defense sought to establish this
through a narrative in which Armenians were represented as the
passive victims of religious persecution by these Islamic neighbors, a
narrative that suggests the ritual purification through violence that is
the epitome of martyrdom.124 By connecting Armenian racial identity
to this persecutor-victim conflict, Armenian racial “purity” was made
proportionate to the negation of Armenian national agency, in effect
claiming that the more pure the persecution the more pure the race. As
Sam Keen writes of political propaganda, “he who projects the power
and responsibility for doing evil onto the enemy loses the ability to
take initiative, to act,”125 and in the defense’s narrative Armenians are
represented with little or no power to act but instead are represented as
passive victims of Turkish persecution. This highlights an important
aspect of the rhetorical strategy of unifying against a common enemy
and may even be crucial to its effect. Social psychologists have noted
the relationship of this phenomenon to the willingness of men to deny
their individual interests and sacrifice themselves on behalf of their
group, for example, and the relationship between persecutory agency
and the paradox of purity is close because the unification that is the
goal of the strategy requires the negation of one or more of the
individual groups that merge to form the new unity.126
123. See KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 35-38 (California ed. 1969).
124. In The Myth of the State, Ernst Cassirer describes the deep disillusionment
Arthur de Gobineau felt after the initial intoxication of his nineteenth-century theories
of racial supremacy subsided, a disillusionment that arose as a result of this paradox of
purity because the “higher races,” as Gobineau conceived of them, could not fulfill
their historical mission of ruling the inferior races without close contact with those
races, but “to them contact is a dangerous thing, the permanent and eternal source of
infection.” See ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 245-46 (1946).
125. KEEN, supra note 28, at 23.
126. See JAMES JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN
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Significantly, the absolutism that results from this sort of paradox
is evident not only in the defense’s claim that Armenians were
absolutely inassimilable with the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims of
Asia Minor, but in its corresponding claim that Armenians were
absolutely assimilable with contemporary Europeans and Americans.
In support of the latter claim, the defense offered a wealth of evidence
including Armenians’ proximity to the people of the Caucasus region
of southwestern Russia who formed the original inspiration for the
Caucasian racial classification, Armenian Christianity and support for
Europeans during the Crusades, marriages between Armenians and
contemporary Europeans and Americans, statistical evidence regarding
prior Armenian naturalizations in the United States, and evidence of
Armenian membership in American churches and professional, civic,
and fraternal organizations.127 The defense also offered evidence that
CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL STUDIES 588-91 (2001) (sub verbo “transcendence”);
Vugt et al., supra note 24, at 22.
127. See, e.g., Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 9-15, 19-24, 26-29, 47-50,
56-95, 64-66, 99, 104-27, 136; Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 511, 36-37, 52-55, 90-93. In presenting this evidence of assimilability, the defense went
to particularly extraordinary lengths to establish that Armenians had been freely
admitted to numerous “whites only” fraternal organizations such as the Freemasons,
the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, the Independent Order of Foresters, the
Fraternal Order of Eagles, the Modern Woodmen of America, the Loyal Order of
Moose, the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, and the Knights of Pythias. See
Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, a-d, 104; United States v. Cartozian, 6 F. 2d
919 (D. Or. 1925); see also Craver, supra note 14, at 56. The defense not only offered
evidence that Armenians were members of these organizations, but presented
testimony from organizational officers of the Freemasons, the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks, the Loyal Order of the Moose, the Independent Order of Odd
Fellows, and the Knights of Pythias regarding the racial prerequisites for membership
in their groups, even introducing the constitution and statutes of the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks into evidence. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1.
The Deputy Grand Master of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, for example,
testified that the Odd Fellows admitted Armenians but excluded Chinese, Japanese,
and Hindus from membership on racial grounds. Id. at 36-38. The defense also elicited
testimony from the Deputy Grand Master that the whiteness of Syrians for purposes of
Odd Fellows membership had been “adjudicated” within the organization and found to
be white. Id. The admission of evidence regarding fraternal racial prerequisites and
private adjudications of whiteness within these organizations raises particularly
interesting questions about the relationship between private dispute resolution and
public law in Cartozian. It is also noteworthy that the defense continued to adopt the
rhetorical strategy of unifying against a common enemy in conjunction with these
direct forms of assimilability evidence. For example, the defense frequently noted
Armenian military service both in the Spanish American War and in World War I in

2012] PERSECUTORY AGENCY IN THE RACIAL PREREQUISITE CASES

163

Armenian immigrant communities in Europe and America did not form
enclaves but readily interspersed with the native European and
American populations, however, and this testimony often took a
particularly disturbing turn, using metaphors of disappearance, loss,
and consumption in support of a claimed assimilation so absolute that
it suggested a continuation of the eliminationist campaign the
Armenians had only recently escaped in the war. When asked about
Armenian “colonies” in Europe, for example, M. Vartan Malcolm
testified that an Armenian colony in Lemberg, Poland that had once
numbered approximately 200,000 Armenians had become assimilated
into the Polish population to such an extent that when he visited
Lemberg a decade before the trial he found “no trace” of the Armenian
colony there with the exception of “the great buildings which these
Armenians had built, and the names of the streets in a certain section of
the town,” because “the entire colony had disappeared by assimilating
with the native population.”128 Similarly, Malcolm testified that the
oldest Armenian colony in Europe, which was in Holland, “has
disappeared, and there are no traces of it left,” that an Armenian colony
in Marseilles, France, too, “has disappeared,” and that Armenian
colonies in Italy and England “have been lost within the native

connection with such assimilability evidence. See Cartozian Tabulation Exhibit, supra
note 108. The defense highlighted the fact that some of the respondents belonged to the
national guard and state defense corps, that several were draft board examiners, and
that others supplied medical and legal advice to draft and exemption boards during the
war. See id. Other respondents worked in support of the Liberty Bond campaign, one
was a Four Minute Man appointed by President Wilson to speak in support of
America’s participation in World War I, and another was a War Work Secretary of the
Y.M.C.A. See id. Judge Wolverton also expressed interest in the question of Armenian
military service. During the testimony of Martin Fereshetian, for example, Judge
Wolverton interjected to ask the witness if he had been in the war, and when the
witness replied that he was exempt but had asked to serve anyway, Judge Wolverton
asked the witness to confirm that he had not claimed an exemption on account of his
nationality. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 23. The defense also
repressed evidence of significant racial discrimination and xenophobia toward
Armenians in the United States during this period. See, e.g., BOBELIAN, supra note 54,
at 110. The transcript reflects several references to Fresno, California as the
Government sought to highlight the well-known racial discrimination toward
Armenians there, and Judge Wolverton asked a witness if she knew what proportion of
the Armenians living in Fresno had been admitted to American citizenship. See
Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 24-25, 72.
128. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 96.
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populations.”129 Franz Boas read from a French writer explaining that
the Armenians had probably not “played an important part in [French]
national history and demography” because immediately upon their
arrival they “submerged themselves in the great French family” and
were “devoured” by the French nation.130 Similarly, one Armenian
witness testified that as soon as Armenians learned to speak English,
they immediately separated from each other and became “very readily
consumed in American life.”131
The language of this testimony suggests particularly extreme
claims of assimilation, an assimilation as absolute as the eliminationist
campaigns such as the Armenian genocide of World War I. This
testimony suggests that the assimilability of Armenians was considered
proportionate to the “decay” of Armenian immigrant communities in
Europe and the United States,132 and the metaphors of disappearance,
loss, and consumption not only reflect the continued elimination of the
Armenian identity elsewhere praised as so resilient to eliminationist
efforts but negates Armenian national agency by representing
Armenians as passive objects in this process of assimilation much like
their agency is negated by their representation as passive victims of
Turkish persecution. As Richard Hovannisian remarked to the
Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal during its session on the Armenian
genocide in 1985, one result of the Allies’ failure to establish an
independent republic of Armenia during the post-World War I period
was a life of exile and dispersion for Armenians, who were “subjected
to inevitable acculturation and assimilation on five continents and
facing an indifferent and even hostile world that preferred not to
remember.”133 The defense’s rhetorical strategy in Cartozian not only
reflects the acceptance of this fate, but by denying Armenians’
frustrated protonationalist aspirations the defense denies the suffering
brought by the forced acculturation and assimilation that is often a
continuing harm of genocide. As Primo Levi writes of the Holocaust of
World War II, “we had not only forgotten our country and our culture,
but also our family, our past, the future we had imagined for ourselves,
129. Id. at 96-97.
130. Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 82-83.
131. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 64, 68.
132. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 93.
133. See Richard G. Hovannisian, The Armenian Question, 1878-1923, in A CRIME
OF SILENCE: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 28 (Gérard Libaridian ed., 1985).
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because, like animals, we were confined to the present moment.”134
The absolute assimilability that the defense sought to establish in
Cartozian reflects a metaphorical continuation of the eliminationist
campaign directed at Armenian history, culture, and identity, and while
this conflict was largely avoided during the trial it clearly emerged
during the final hours of testimony.
The conflict between Armenian protonationalism and the absolute
assimilability of Armenians with Europeans and Americans becomes
most apparent during the final hours of the trial when the
Government’s attorney cross-examines M. Vartan Malcolm about his
1919 book The Armenians in America, where in stark contrast to his
unqualified endorsement of Armenian assimilability with Americans
during his testimony in Cartozian he writes that Armenians are less
than entirely assimilable to American life.135 In one passage of the
book, for example, Malcolm states that “an independent Armenia will
naturally attract many Armenians who are now in the United States”
because Armenians “have no home here” and would long to return to
their birthplace in Armenia which they could never forget. In other
passages, Malcolm claims that “as a rule Armenians marry within their
own race” and warns Armenian men against marrying American
women. Elsewhere he cites among the reasons Armenians should
return to Armenia the fact that they had been excluded from American
trade unions because they were regarded as “foreigners” and that their
ignorance of the English language and American customs would lead
to nothing but frustration if they remained in America.136 When the
Government’s attorney confronts Malcolm with the contradiction
between such passages and his assertions that Armenians were entirely
assimilable to American life, Malcolm explains frankly that he had
written Armenians in America in connection with the Paris Peace
Conference and the negotiations of the United States and other Allied
powers for the independent republic of Armenia President Wilson had
promised. Malcolm explains that all of that changed after the plan for
an independent Armenia had failed, and he acknowledges that the
purpose of his book had been argumentative:
134. PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 75 (Raymond Rosenthal trans.,
Summit Books 1989).
135. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 147-55.
136. See MALCOLM, supra note 55, at 83-126.
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What I say there does not mean that the Armenians are
not faithful and good citizens of America, but that the
Armenian colony in America would furnish some
material which, in some measure, would help to build up
an Armenian state, and help to improve conditions in the
East and to make a better world and less war.137
This exchange highlights the difficult identity issues facing Armenian
refugees during the postwar period and the conflict between the
frequent Armenian testimony of assimilability offered to satisfy the
requirements of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Thind and the
protonationalist aspirations that had grown doubtful at the time of the
Cartozian trial. The paradoxical position reflected in the defense’s case
reveals this tension in a way the judicial opinion ignores and illustrates
the problems that evidence of assimilability presented in the racial
prerequisite cases.

THE “HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION” OF RACE AND THE
PROBLEM OF NARRATIVITY IN JUDGE WOLVERTON’S OPINION
Judge Wolverton did not issue his opinion in Cartozian until July
27, 1925, more than a year after the trial. Judge Wolverton had been a
judge for thirty years at the time of the Cartozian trial, having been
appointed to the federal bench in 1905 by President Theodore
Roosevelt after serving more than a decade on the Oregon Supreme
Court, and Judge Wolverton had already issued two significant
opinions interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act. It
was Judge Wolverton’s district court opinion that the Supreme Court
had recently reversed in Thind,138 and a decade earlier he published an
opinion in In re Ellis holding that a Syrian petitioner was “white” and
therefore racially eligible for naturalization.139 In Ellis, Judge
137. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 153-55.
138. See generally In re Thind, 268 F. 683 (D. Or. 1920), rev’d, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)
139. See In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1003 (D. Or. 1910). In contrast to the Supreme
Court’s reversal of Judge Wolverton’s opinion in Thind, his opinion in Ellis was
included among a list of lower court opinions expressly approved of by the Court in
Ozawa because Judge Wolverton had written in Ellis that the ordinary usage rule of
statutory interpretation required that the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act be
interpreted according to its “popular sense.” See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178,
197 (1918) (including In re Ellis in a list of cases with which “we see no reason to
differ”). Because in Thind the Supreme Court reversed two cases holding that Hindus
were “white” after also expressly approving of them in Ozawa, however, some doubted
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Wolverton had relied almost exclusively on the Government’s
admission that the petitioner was “white” but rejected the
Government’s argument that the racial prerequisite in the Act did not
include all whites but only those people of the “white race” who at the
time the Naturalization Act was passed either lived in Europe or on the
American continent and were “inured to European governmental
institutions.” Judge Wolverton briefly cited Daniel Brinton’s Races
and Peoples, Augustus Keane’s The World’s Peoples, and Joseph
Deniker’s The Races of Man and noted that from these sources the
Government’s attorney admitted that the petitioner was “a member of
what is known as the white or Caucasian race.”140 In Thind, Judge
Wolverton relied on previous lower court precedent, citing cases
holding that Armenians, Asian Indians, and Parsis were “white” within
the meaning of the Act as particularly illustrative.141 Beyond these
precedents, Judge Wolverton offered no other authorities to support his
decision in Thind.
In Cartozian, Judge Wolverton did not have the opportunity to
adopt the approach he had taken in either Ellis or Thind. Instead, he
adopted the defense’s theory of the case in its entirety, although as
discussed below, Judge Wolverton’s opinion manifests a marked
absence of narrativity that raises intriguing questions about his
response to the “historical interpretation” of race that had recently
emerged in case law interpreting the racial prerequisite in the
Naturalization Act. The defense’s tripartite case for Armenian racial
eligibility for naturalization discussed above provides the basic
structure of Judge Wolverton’s opinion: (1) Armenians descended from
premodern “white” ancestors who originated in Europe and migrated to
Asia Minor in the seventh century B.C.E., (2) Armenians had remained
“white” due to their unique geographical, linguistic, and religious
isolation in Asia Minor, and (3) Armenians readily assimilated with
contemporary Europeans and Americans (although with regard to this
third part of the argument Judge Wolverton places greater emphasis on
Armenia’s proximity to and alliance with the Russian people of the
Caucasus region who were the original inspiration for the Caucasian
the status of Ellis after Thind as well.
140. Judge Wolverton also noted that the petitioner was “reared a Catholic, and is
still of that faith.” In re Ellis, 179 F. at 1002-03.
141. See In re Thind, 268 F. 683, 684 (D. Or. 1920).
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racial classification than on the other assimilability evidence cited in
his opinion).
Judge Wolverton begins his defense of Armenian whiteness in the
opinion with the foundational premise that Armenians belonged to the
Alpine subdivision of the Caucasian race, beginning this section of his
opinion with the simple declaration, “That the Armenians are of Alpine
stock can scarcely be doubted.” He then lists numerous authorities
supplied by the defense to support this classical hypothesis of
Armenian descent from Europeans who migrated to Asia Minor in the
seventh century B.C.E., citing Herodotus’s Histories, Strabo’s
Geography, Daniel Brinton’s Races and Peoples, William Ripley’s
Races of Europe, Henry Lynch’s Armenia, Travels and Studies, and
Alfred Haddon’s The Races of Man and Their Distribution, as well as
the testimony of Franz Boas and Roland Dixon.142 Judge Wolverton
uses curiously hyperbolic language to defend this hypothesis, writing
that “all the evidence points to” the European origins of Armenians,
that the continuity of the Alpine race across Asia Minor “cannot be
doubted,” that the authors and writers relied on by Boas and Dixon are
“entirely reliable” and their conclusions have been accepted “without
hesitation,” and that the evidence is so overwhelming that “nobody
doubts” it.143 With this language, Judge Wolverton ignores and perhaps
even seeks to suppress the alternative hypotheses of more
heterogeneous Armenian origins discussed in Judge Lowell’s opinion
in Halladjian and M. Vartan Malcom’s book The Armenians in
America.
After advancting this foundational premise, Judge Wolverton
then offers his version of the historical narrative that justifies his
finding that the Armenians not only descended from a premodern IndoEuropean ancestor but had remained “white” despite residing in Asia
for centuries through their unique geographical, linguistic, and
religious isolation. In contrast to the detail given this narrative by the
Armenian defense, however, Judge Wolverton reduces this narrative to
the following two sentences in the Cartozian opinion:
Although the Armenian province is within the confines
of the Turkish Empire, being in Asia Minor, the people
thereof have always held themselves aloof from the

142. United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 920 (D. Or. 1925).
143. Id.
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Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be
said, on account of their religion, though color may have
had something to do with it. The Armenians, tradition
has it, very early, about the fourth century, espoused the
Christian religion, and have ever since consistently
adhered to their belief, and practiced it.144
Unlike Judge Wolverton’s conclusion that the evidence of Armenians’
descent from Indo-European ancestors is so overwhelming that
“nobody doubts it,” this passage is fraught with doubt and hesitation
and reflects a markedly ambiguous agency at the center of the
narrative.
The most significant language in this passage is the phrase “held
themselves aloof,” particularly the word “aloof.” By condensing the
defense’s historical narrative of Islamic persecution and martyrdom in
Asia Minor into the brief statement that the Armenians “held
themselves aloof” from the Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples of the
region, Judge Wolverton introduces an ambiguity regarding the agency
in the narrative that suggests an inability or unwillingness to clarify it.
The Armenians are given the active voice in this passage, but are they
also given the active agency?145 Who is doing what to whom in Judge
Wolverton’s account? Did the Armenians discriminate against the
Turks, vice versa, or both, and who was to blame for the rigid
segregation between the two groups? This was, after all, a significant
historical question at issue in the case. Much of the testimony had
addressed whether or not the Armenian communities in Europe and the
United States formed enclaves, leading the defense to make such
strong claims of Armenian assimilability with contemporary Europeans
and Americans as that Armenian colonies in Europe and America had
left “no trace” of themselves or been “devoured” or “consumed” by the
local populations. Moreover, one of the familiar claims of genocide
denial is that the perpetrators are the real victims because the killing
was committed in self-defense and the perpetrators also suffered
144. Id.
145. As The Oxford Companion to the English Language explains, “in English, the
semantic role of the subject in active constructions is typically agentive, but not
exclusively so: books in These books sell well is not the agent but the affected.” See
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Tom McArthur ed., 1992) (sub
verbo “agent”).
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casualties. With regard to the Armenian genocide, Turkey claimed that
Armenians were separatists who provoked the atrocities against them
by forming alliances with foreign powers and that the genocide of
World War I was justified by the fact that Armenians joined Russian
forces during the war to form a “fifth column” inside the Ottoman
Empire.146 The ambiguity of the word “aloof” in the Cartozian opinion
suggests a deliberate evasion of this central question of who was
responsible for the isolation of Armenians from the Turks, Kurds, and
allied peoples in Asia Minor.
The word “aloof” originally derives from “a loof,” a combination
of the preposition “a,” referring to motion toward a position of contact,
and the noun “loof,” referring to the palm of the hand. The combined
form “a loof” came to refer to the injunction to a rudder operator of a
ship to “keep your loof” in the act of turning the ship toward the wind
and clear of the direction where it might otherwise drift. From this
arose the sense of “steering clear of,” or “giving a wide berth to”
anything with which one might otherwise come in contact, as in the
exhortation to “keep aloof.” The word may also describe a lack of
sympathy or community with a person or group, in the sense of
someone who stands “coldly aloof” from others.147 The latter meaning
is more often associated with the verb “hold,” or alternatively “stand”
or “keep,” as in the phrases, “stood aloof,” “kept aloof,” “held aloof,”
or Judge Wolverton’s phrase “held themselves aloof.” This sense of
“aloof” may even refer to a person ignoring pleas of help or
appeasement, as in the final act of Shakespeare’s Hamlet when Laertes
tells Hamlet “I stand aloof, and will no reconcilement,”148 or may
146. See generally, JONES, supra note 39, at 168-72; Dadrian, The Turkish Military
Tribunal’s Prosecution, supra note 43, at 34. The Turkish Attorney General who
prosecuted the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide in the war crimes trials held in
the Ottoman Empire after World War I even partially blamed the victims for provoking
the atrocities during his opening remarks, a claim that elicited protest from the
Armenian lawyers who strongly disputed the accuracy and propriety of the Attorney
General’s remarks and left the proceedings in protest after failing to have him
disqualified. The Ottoman officials on trial also asserted that their acts were required
by Armenian threats to state security, but these assertions were contradicted by
documentary evidence introduced during the proceedings. Dadrian, supra note 43, at
34-36, 38-39.
147. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 359 (J.A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner eds.,
2d ed. 1989).
148. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE
WORKS (Stanley Wells et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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suggest a resistance offered to temptation, echoing its earlier use as an
injunction to turn a ship toward the wind so that it does not drift.
This tension between those who “hold themselves aloof” and the
group denied sympathy or community by this action creates a
remarkably ambiguous representation of agency. What is the nature of
the relationship between the Armenians and their Islamic neighbors in
Asia Minor in this narrative? How does it explain centuries of
Armenian isolation despite the close proximity to these people? Have
the Armenians “held themselves aloof” for fear of being massacred or
of being seduced (either religiously or sexually)? Judge Wolverton
adds that the Armenians held themselves aloof based “principally . . .
on account of their religion, though color may have had something to
do with it,” an explanation that further compounds the ambiguity of the
passage rather than clarifies it. The unequivocal claim that the
Armenians “always” held themselves aloof from these people was
necessary to distinguish the case from Thind, yet the certainty of the
claim is almost immediately contradicted by the hesitation of merely
claiming that “it might be said” that this isolation was principally due
to religion but that color “may” have had “something” to do with it.149
Moreover, the trial record reflects no discussion of “color” having
anything to do with the relationship between the Armenians and the
Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples of Asia Minor, at least not explicitly.
Are the Turks, Kurds, and allied people of Asia Minor persecutors or
victims in this passage? What does the answer reflect about Armenian
assimilability in the diverse population of early twentieth century
America? The passage leaves these questions unanswered.
At almost the same time as the trial in Cartozian, the word
“aloof” also appears in United States v. Pandit, a racial prerequisite
case in which the Government sought to cancel the naturalization
certificate of Asian Indian immigrant Sakharam Pandit after the
Supreme Court held that high caste Hindus were racially ineligible for
naturalization in Thind. In what appears to have been a novel strategy
in the racial prerequisite cases, Pandit had argued that the Government
149. The second sentence of the quoted passage from the Cartozian opinion reflects
a similar juxtaposition of certainty and hesitation, claiming “tradition has it” that in
“about” the fourth century Armenians adopted Christianity but have “ever since
consistently adhered” to their belief and practiced it. United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d
919, 920 (D. Or. 1925).
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was equitably estopped from canceling his naturalization certificate
because among other things he had lost his high caste status in India
when he became an American citizen and if his naturalization
certificate were canceled he would be an outcast in India and a stateless
person. When an expert witness testified in an evidentiary hearing that
a high caste Hindu who became an American citizen would lose his
high caste status in India, Judge Paul McCormick interrupted the
witness to ask if Brahmins in India exercised rights as British subjects,
adding, “I mean, do they do it because of necessity or through choice?
Does the Brahmin as a caste, the Hindu caste, hold itself aloof from the
rest of the citizenry and accept the political status simply because they
have to accept it?”150 In this question, Judge McCormick uses “aloof”
in a phrase nearly identical to Judge Wolverton’s in Cartozian, but in
the context of asking whether a Brahmin’s exercise of his rights as a
British subject was voluntary. Judge McCormick’s use of “aloof” in
Pandit leaves no ambiguity; for the Brahmin caste to “hold itself aloof”
in the context of Judge McCormick’s question is unmistakably an act
of choice.
A different use of “aloof” appears in a 1951 opinion of the United
States Board of Immigration Appeals holding that the Kalmyk people
of southeastern European Russia, although originally “a tribe of
Mongolian stock” and Asiatic in origin, were “white” within the
meaning of the Nationality Act of 1940 by virtue of their identification
with Europeans by several generations of affinity, education, cultural
activity, and several decades of Soviet rule in Russia. In the course of
limiting the scope of its opinion, the Board carefully distinguishes the
Kalmyks of southeastern European Russia to whom the opinion refers
from the Kalmyks who migrated east to China in 1771, because unlike
the former group of Kalmyks the latter “stayed aloof from the
neighboring Russian and non-Russian tribes” out of “fear of Russian
Tsarist influence and domination.”151 This use of “aloof” suggests a
passive or reactionary agency as the Kalmyks fled the Russian Tsar,
perhaps even suggesting that they were chased or driven. Like Judge
McCormick’s use of “aloof” in Pandit, the agency in the Board’s use
150. Transcript of Record, United States v. Sakharam Ganesh Pandit, No. 4938 (9th
Cir. Aug. 13, 1926), 121-22 (emphasis added), in Records of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, Record Group 276, National Archives and Records Administration Pacific
Region, San Bruno, Calif.
151. In re R–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 275, 280 (B.I.A. 1951) (emphasis added).
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of “aloof” is relatively clear, although the agency lies as much with the
Tsar as with the Kalmyks. By contrast to these examples, however, the
agency of Judge Wolverton’s claim that the Armenians “held
themselves aloof” from the Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples of Asia
Minor remains unclear.
Studies of the racial prerequisite cases that focus exclusively on
the direct evidence of assimilability discussed in Judge Wolverton’s
opinion in Cartozian also neglect the fact that a close reading of the
opinion reveals that he only relies on evidence of Armenian marriages
to contemporary Europeans and Americans, prior Armenian
naturalizations and membership in American social clubs, and
Armenian use of the English language to corroborate a more figurative
argument regarding Armenians’ affiliation with the Russian people of
the Caucasus region of southwestern Russia. Specifically, after
advancing his extraordinarily condensed version of the defense’s
historical narrative, Judge Wolverton argues that Armenians are
assimilable with contemporary Europeans and Americans based on the
geographical and political proximity of Armenians to the Russian
people of the Caucasus region who originally inspired the Caucasian
racial classification, an argument Judge Wolverton notes is one of
analogy:
Whatever analogy there may be or may exist between
the Caucasian and the white races that may be of
assistance in the present controversy, the alliance of the
Armenians with the Caucasians of Russia has ever been
very close. Indeed, the Armenians have for many
generations, possibly centuries, occupied territory in
Caucasian Russia, have intermingled freely and
harmoniously with that people, and the races mix and
amalgamate readily and spontaneously.152
152. Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 920. Judge Wolverton’s use of the word “spontaneously”
in this passage appeals to the notion of “racial instincts,” once again responding to
Thind in which the Supreme Court concluded that the racial difference of high caste
Hindus was “of such character and extent that the great body of our people
instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation.” United States v.
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 210-11 (1923). In 1896, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson had similarly claimed that “legislation is powerless to eradicate racial
instinct, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences.” Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). During the era surrounding World War I, this

174

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2

The prominence given this argument in Judge Wolverton’s opinion
significantly outweighs the emphasis placed on it by the defense.
Although during Franz Boas’s testimony he quoted a passage from
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s On the Natural Variety of Mankind in
which Blumenbach explains that he named the Caucasian racial
classification after Mount Caucasus because he considered the people
of that region “the most beautiful race of men” and “the autochthones
of mankind,”153 the trial transcript is otherwise entirely silent on the
etymology of the Caucasian racial classification. Furthermore, the only
testimony regarding the Armenian alliance with the Russian people of
the Caucasus region came when M. Vartan Malcolm testified that the
Armenians took refuge in the Caucasus to save themselves from the
Armenian genocide of World War I.154 Judge Wolverton’s metonymic
claim that Armenians’ proximity to and affiliation with the Russian
people of the Caucasus region demonstrated that Armenians were
“white” is also curious in light of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
Caucasian racial classification as an index for the meaning of the racial
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, unless Judge Wolverton believed
the metonymic association supplied evidence of the ordinary or
popular meaning of the term “white.”
Although prior studies of Cartozian have largely focused on the
evidence of Armenian marriages to contemporary Europeans and
Americans, prior Armenian naturalizations and membership in
American social clubs, and Armenian use of the English language
referenced toward the end of the Cartozian opinion, it is significant
that Judge Wolverton first emphasizes the claim that Armenians are
metonymically “white” by virtue of their association with the Russian
people of the Caucasus. Moreover, after making this argument Judge
Wolverton pauses to state that “the status of the [Armenian] people
thus evolved is practically conclusive of their eligibility to citizenship
in the United States, seeing that they are of Alpine stock, and so remain
belief in racial instincts developed into the argument that the truths of race did not need
scientific verification but could be learned from “intuition.” See, e.g., THOMAS F.
GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 353 (New ed. 1997); WILLIAM
PETERSEN ET AL., CONCEPTS OF ETHNICITY 88 (1980). Although a theory of racial
instincts also appears to be the basis for the defense’s theory of the case in Cartozian,
Judge Wolverton’s claim that Armenians “spontaneously” intermingled with other
“whites” is the most explicit statement of this theory in the record.
153. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 66.
154. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 155.
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to the present time, without appreciable blending with the Mongolian
or other kindred races.”155 Contrary to prior scholarly emphasis on the
assimilability evidence in the latter half of the opinion, Judge
Wolverton clearly indicates his satisfaction with the evidence discussed
at this earlier point in the opinion as “practically conclusive” of the
question. He only catalogues additional assimilability evidence after
remarking, “but to pursue the inquiry further, it may be confidently
affirmed that Armenians are white persons, and moreover that they
readily amalgamate with the European and white races.”156 He then
catalogues testimony and statistical evidence introduced by James
Barton, Franz Boas, Roland Dixon, Mrs. Otis Floyd Lamson, M.
Vartan Malcolm, and Paul Rohrbach regarding Armenian assimilability
with contemporary Europeans and Americans, including statistical
evidence introduced by Boas and Malcolm.157
When Judge Wolverton’s opinion in Cartozian is considered as a
whole, it is also apparent that his condensed narrative of Armenian
isolation in Asia Minor is not the only passage in which the agency of
the events depicted is ambiguous, but the opinion generally fails to
clarify the agency in the events described and attributes virtually no
agency to Armenians. Judge Wolverton represents the Armenians as a
people whose origins are shrouded in mythology, migrate from Europe
to Asia Minor, then “hold themselves aloof” from dark Islamic hordes
until they are driven out of the region and consumed by the populations
of Europe and the United States. In the Cartozian opinion, the
Armenians truly are a people without a country because they have no
national agency. The absence of a clear agency in the opinion also
forms part of a larger pattern of narrative refusal manifested in a lack
of transitional words and phrases in the opinion, any clear framework
linking the beginning and ending of the opinion, or a coherent order of
meaning in which the relationships between events are ordered into a
purposive sequence. While the opinion depends on a particular
historical account of Armenian isolation from their Islamic neighbors
in Asia Minor, the account of this isolation is presented with virtually
no narrative development, which is also lacking in the rest of the
opinion. Instead, the sections before and after the historical account
155. United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 920 (D. Or. 1925).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 921.

176

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2

read more like a catalogue of evidentiary items with no explanation of
the relationship between them and no recognition of their contested
nature.
This absence of narrativity in the Cartozian opinion is
particularly interesting because it suggests the form of natural history
that Hayden White attributes to annals in contrast to fully developed
histories. In his essay “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation
of Reality,” White argues that unlike a fully realized history, annalists
show no concern for any system of human morality or law but present
“a world in which things happen to people rather than one in which
people do things,” a world in which events “appear to belong to the
same order of existence as the natural events which bring either ‘great’
crops
or
‘deficient’
harvests,
and
are
as
seemingly
incomprehensible.”158 Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of
racialist science in Thind, the stylistic choices reflected in the
Cartozian opinion suggest a world of biological determinism, and in
this sense Judge Wolverton’s opinion suggests a continued
ambivalence about the “historical interpretation” of race that had
recently emerged in the case law. Throughout the opinion, Judge
Wolverton introduces rhetorical appeals to scientific authority and
statistical evidence in close proximity to the historical narratives on
which the opinion most centrally relies, as though the certainty of
science might compensate for the contingency of histories steeped in
mythology, tradition, and figurality.
What is perhaps most remarkable about the judicial opinion in
contrast to the trial transcript in Cartozian, however, is the opinion’s
deafening silence regarding the Armenian genocide and the resulting
displacement of Armenians that gave rise to the case in the first place
and the threat of statelessness the case posed were Armenians denied
eligibility for naturalization to the United States. Even in Halladjian,
written years before the Armenian genocide of World War I, Judge
Lowell wrote that since the Armenians’ final conquest by the Turks
they had been “oppressed by the Turks, and have looked vainly to
Europe for relief.”159 As is apparent from the Cartozian trial transcript,
the violent persecution of the Armenians by Turks, Kurds, and Syrian
158. HAYDEN WHITE, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in
THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL
REPRESENTATION, at 10, 14 (1990).
159. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
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Muslims was a central theme of the defense’s case, offered to explain
why Armenians remained “white” despite centuries of residence in
Asia while Asian Indians had not remained “white” in the Indian
subcontinent. Judge Wolverton was clearly presented with an exigency
to speak to this issue, but neglects to even allude to it in his opinion.
This raises particularly difficult questions given the silences that have
attended many genocides and the Armenian genocide in particular,
which was long referred to as the “forgotten genocide,” the
“unremembered genocide,” the “hidden holocaust,” or the “secret
genocide.”160 Is Judge Wolverton’s silence and the absence of a clear
narrative in the Cartozian opinion a part of this legacy of silences
surrounding genocide?
As the first genocide in modern history, the Armenian genocide
left spectators as well as survivors with a powerful feeling of
speechlessness, the sense that they were confronting an event for which
there were not yet words. As one writer attempted to describe it during
the postwar period,
Those bodies endured the most frightful physical
suffering possible to human flesh and nerves—more than
your imagination can conceive after reading all the
horrors of Indian torture; of shipwreck and starvation in
open boat or on desert island; of famine and pestilence in
India or China; of being lost on the trackless desert; of
being mangled and burned in a wreck of railroad train or
of theater or of home; or of tortures by Inquisition or by
Roman Empire. All that you have experienced or
witnessed or read or heard of pain and horror pales
before the dreadful realities of Armenian famine and
massacre.161
This author’s effort to negatively define these traumatic experiences by
reference to the horrors that they surpass has now become a
commonplace of genocide discourse, and genocide has often posed
such unique challenges to speech that silence is considered the only
appropriate response to it. In his study of the oral narratives of
Holocaust survivors, Lawrence Langer concludes that the frequent

160. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at xii.; JONES, supra note 39, at 149.
161. Lee, supra note 106, at 67.
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refusal of Holocaust survivors to speak of their trauma is sometimes
motivated by an “anxiety of futility,” the certainty that those who most
need to understand will not understand and may even be alienated by
the incomprehensibility of the events. Because such events dispel the
idea that choice is “purely an internal matter, immune to circumstance
and chance,”162 they contest the notion of autonomous agency on which
law, narrative, and history depend and even the concept of narrativity
itself, a view perhaps suggested by Theodor Adorno’s statement that to
write poetry after Auschwitz would be barbaric.163 Perhaps Judge
Wolverton found that the only appropriate response to the history of
violence at the heart of the defense’s historical narrative was silence or
that the history of this violence was so incomprehensible as to defy
narratativity. The answer to this question is ultimately unknowable, but
the problem of narrativity in the context of genocide offers a possible
explanation of the broader narrative refusal reflected in the Cartozian
opinion.

TRANSCENDING RACIAL DIVISIONS BY UNIFYING AGAINST
COMMON ENEMIES
The Department of Labor initially moved to appeal Judge
Wolverton’s decision in Cartozian to the Supreme Court but agreed to
drop the appeal after the change of administrations following President
Harding’s death brought opposition to any appeal.164 The record of the
proceedings in Cartozian not only offers the most detailed record
available of the arguments and evidence advanced to determine
whether a particular petitioner was “white” within the meaning of the
racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, but is one of the earliest
cases to have interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinions regarding racial
eligibility for naturalization in Ozawa and Thind. The record in
Cartozian reveals that the defense used a rhetorical strategy of unifying
against a common enemy, invoking both cultural memories of the
Crusades and the Mongol invasions of medieval Europe reflected in the
legends of merciless slaughter committed by such figures as Attila the

162. Cf. LAWRENCE LANGER, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES: THE RUINS OF MEMORY xii
(1991).
163. See, e.g., Liliane Weissberg, In Plain Sight, in VISUAL CULTURE AND THE
HOLOCAUST, 14 (Barbie Zelizer ed., 2001).
164. See Craver, supra note 14, at 56.
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Hun, Genghis Kahn, and Tamerlane,165 as well as contemporary
tensions between the United States and Turkey arising out of World
War I and continued Turkish aggression toward Armenians and
American missionaries. The trial transcript in Cartozian also reveals
the conflict between the assimilability that the Armenians claimed with
contemporary Europeans and Americans and their protonationalist
desire for an independent republic of Armenia that had become
doubtful by the time of the trial, a conflict not evident in the judicial
opinion but which highlights the difficult identity issues at the center of
the case.
Since Benedict Anderson’s groundbreaking work on nationalism
in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, in which Anderson claims the nation is only an “imagined
political community,”166 numerous studies have followed of the ways
in which national identity is rhetorically constructed. As M. Lane
Bruner writes, national identities are negotiated through “the clash of
multiple and conflicting discourses, including battles over memory,
over domestic and foreign policy, and over constitutions and the
meaning of laws,” battles in which contradictory aspects of national
history are erased or suppressed through narrative omissions to create
the false appearance of a heterogeneous history.167 Importantly, studies
165. See KEEVAK, supra note 11, at 4, 75-76; see also KEEN, supra note 28, at 26.
(“The old image of Genghis Khan and the Mongol hordes still haunts us and is retooled
and pressed into service when needed.”). Michael Keevak argues that it was only at the
end of the nineteenth century that “the idea of a yellow East Asia would fully take hold
in the Western imagination, crystallizing in the phrase ‘the yellow peril’ to characterize
the perceived threat that the people of the Far East were now said to embody” and that
the association of yellow skin with Asian races during the nineteenth century firmly
brought together what had been closely allied for centuries, “yellow skin, numerous
‘Mongolian’ invasions, and the specter of large numbers of people from the region
migrating to the West.” KEEVAK, supra note 11, at 124-25.
166. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM, 145-46 (2d ed. 2006); see also VANESSA B.
BEASLEY, YOU, THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PRESIDENTIAL
RHETORIC (2004); METAPHORICAL WORLD POLITICS (Francis A. Beer and Christ’l De
Landtsheer, eds., 2004); M. LANE BRUNER, STRATEGIES OF REMEMBRANCE: THE
RHETORICAL DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION (2002); COHEN,
supra note 25; MAURICE OLENDER, THE LANGUAGES OF PARADISE: RACE, RELIGION,
AND PHILOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2008);
SARA SULERI, THE RHETORIC OF ENGLISH INDIA (1992).
167. See BRUNER, supra note 166, at 1-11, 89; cf. Eve Darian-Smith,

180

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2

of nationality have frequently compared and contrasted national
identity with race and religion, the imagined communities that the
nation displaced. Thus, Anderson writes that in western Europe the
eighteenth century “marks not only the dawn of the age of nationalism
but the dusk of religious modes of thought” and that nationalism “has
to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it,”
specifically those religious communities and dynastic realms “out of
which—as well as against which—it came into being.”168 Similarly,
Maurice Olender notes the indelible mark left on the twentieth century
by eighteenth and nineteenth century philologists whose search for the
origins of human language linked philology with the preeminence of
particular races, religions, and nations, and whose emphasis on the
declining importance of race in favor of linguistic and religious
identities eventually rendered race “a matter of language, religion,
laws, and customs, more than of blood.”169 The conflicts between these
competing forms of group identity are powerfully revealed in the racial
prerequisite cases of the early twentieth century, particularly those
cases adopting the “historical interpretation” of race, and Cartozian
illustrates how such identities were forged through the rhetorical
strategy of unifying against common enemies.
This rhetorical strategy is not unique to Cartozian or to the
historiography of the early twentieth century racial prerequisite cases,
but expressions of solidarity against common enemies are found
throughout the legislative, executive, and judicial discourse
surrounding the racial prerequisites in the Naturalization Act,
suggesting that many of the participants in this discourse found the
strategy particularly persuasive of racial classification. In the earliest
interpretation of the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act by the
United States Supreme Court, for example, Chief Justice Roger Taney
wrote in his infamous majority opinion in Dred Scott that in drafting
the original Naturalization Act, while the First Congress could have
provided for the naturalization of American Indians, “in their untutored
and savage state no one would have thought of admitting them as
Postcolonialism: A Brief Introduction, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 291, 297 (1996) (noting
that “law, alongside climate, geography, history, and cultural practices, shapes the
mythological imagery” of national identities).
168. ANDERSON, supra note 166, at 11-19.
169. OLENDER, supra note 166, at 58-59.
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citizens in a civilized community,” and
moreover, the atrocities they had but recently committed,
when they were allies of Great Britain in the
Revolutionary War, were yet fresh in the recollection of
the people of the United States, and they were even then
guarding themselves against the threatened renewal of
Indian hostilities. No one supposed then that any Indian
would ask for, or was capable of enjoying, the privileges
of an American citizen, and the word white [in the
Naturalization Act] was not used with any particular
reference to them.
Furthermore, although Justice Taney acknowledges that American
Indians were not constitutionally incapable of becoming citizens but
simply not contemplated by the original Act’s racial prerequisite, to
support his contrary conclusion that Africans were constitutionally
incapable of becoming citizens he writes that while American Indian
governments were deemed foreign they were also free and “their
alliance sought for in war.” Moreover, amidst a lengthy body of
evidence that Justice Taney cites in support of the majority’s decision
in Dred Scott, he lends particular emphasis to the fact that Africans
were racially ineligible to fight in defense of the states under state
militia laws, noting that “nothing could more strongly mark the entire
repudiation of the African race” than its ineligibility to fight in defense
of the states because “he forms no part of the sovereignty of the state,
and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it.”170
Other courts concluded that judicial interpretations of the racial
prerequisite in the Act had broadened as a result of the Revolutionary
War and the various annexation treaties of the nineteenth century in
which the United States naturalized the inhabitants of annexed
territories without regard to race. One federal judge wrote regarding
the period when the First Congress drafted the original Naturalization

170. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404, 415, 419-20 (1857). Similar to Justice
Taney’s remarks about the savagery of American Indians, a later opinion by an Alaska
district court holding that an American Indian was not “white” within the meaning of
the Naturalization Act noted that it was the practice of the United States at the time the
Act was written to treat the American Indian tribes in the same manner as “peoples or
tribes unfriendly to our government, living under conditions of barbarism.” In re
Burton, 1 Alaska 111, 114 (D. Alaska 1900).
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Act, for example:
As the inhabitants of what was then the United States
were a more or less homogeneous people who or whose
immediate forbears had come from what has been
termed “Northern Europe,” and as the vast territories
then known as Florida and as Louisiana formed no part
of our national domain, and as our people had been in
almost continuous conflict with the French and
Spaniards, it is doubtful whether the words “white
persons,” as used in common speech, originally included
any of the so-called Latin races. The events of the
Revolution, however, and the gratitude which our people
felt toward France, and more especially the large number
of French Huguenots who had come to make their
homes here, caused instant recognition of the French as
having a common heritage with us, and the phrase
automatically expanded to include them.171
Similarly, in an opinion holding that a “pure-blooded Mexican”
petitioner was “white” and therefore eligible for naturalization, another
federal district court judge relied heavily on the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, the Adams–Onís Treaty, and the Gadsden Treaty, which had
naturalized numerous Mexican inhabitants of newly acquired territories
without regard to race.172 In fact, in Justice McLean’s dissenting
opinion in Dred Scott he noted that “on the question of citizenship it
must be admitted that we have not been very fastidious,” referencing
the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in which “we have made citizens of
all grades, combinations, and colors,” and the Adams–Onís Treaty
which naturalized the inhabitants of the annexed Florida and Louisiana
territories without regard to race.173
Following World War I and the emergence of displaced and
stateless persons like the Armenians, this rhetorical strategy of unifying
against a common enemy also served the plight of such groups who
sought asylum before legal protections for asylees had matured. This
strategy appears in the opinions issued in two cases before the United
States Board of Immigration Appeals during the early Cold War era,
for example, determining the racial eligibility of refugees from the
171. In re Singh, 246 F. 496, 498-99 (E.D. Pa. 1917).
172. See In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 349 (W.D. Tex. 1897).
173. See Sandford, 60 U.S. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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Soviet Union for admission to the United States after they had been
refused entry by immigration officials on the basis that they were not
“white” and therefore “ineligible to citizenship” as defined by the
Immigration Act of 1924. In opinions concluding that the Tatar and
Kalmyk immigrants in these cases were “white” within the meaning of
the Nationality Act of 1940 “in spite of their Asiatic origin” and
overturning the decisions to deny the immigrants admission, the Board
of Immigration Appeals highlights the systematic displacement and
deportation of the immigrants by the Soviet government. In a 1950
case involving a Tatar immigrant from eastern Russia, “Mohammedan
by religion,” the Board notes that the immigrant was a soldier in the
Red Army from 1941 to 1945 but after he was captured by the German
army “he stated that he was born in Istanbul, Turkey, to avoid
repatriation to Russia,” and that the people of his birthplace were
“reportedly being systematically displaced or exterminated and
replaced by a special military class of so-called Russianized Cossacks
or trusted members of the Red Army’s communist youth
organization.”174 Similarly, in a 1951 case involving Kalmyk
immigrants, the Board notes that the immigrants in the case “fled from
Russia about 1920, after resisting the communist revolutionary forces,”
that in 1943 the Soviet Politbureau “determined that the Kalmuks
should be displaced and deported, because they opposed the oppressive
regime and, hence, were considered wanting in loyalty, dangerous to
the State,” and that the “helpless Kalmuk minority group” was herded
into unheated railroad cars and deported, “without warning and at gunpoint,” many of them dying en route.175 In both cases, the Board’s
opinions emphasize that the immigrants had been subjected to
deportation and eliminationist campaigns by America’s new Cold War
enemy the Soviet Union and were seeking refuge in the United States,
reflecting a persecutory agency remarkably similar to that of the
Armenian defense in Cartozian.
In Matthew Frye Jacobson’s examination of the relationship
between whiteness and American imperialism, he refers to a similar
process he calls the “crucible of empire,” by which the whiteness of
non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants from Europe whose whiteness had often
been considered inferior to that of Anglo-Saxons during the late
174. In re S–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 104 (B.I.A. 1950).
175. See In re R–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 275, 276, 280 (B.I.A. 1951).
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nineteenth century was confirmed as American expansion into the
Pacific and the imagination of Pacific natives as “savages” dissolved
the boundary between such “superior” and “inferior” whites.176 The
racial prerequisite cases reveal similar examples of this process far
beyond the probationary “white” races of Europe, however, as
Armenians and other immigrants from central and western Asia were
also made “white” by the alchemic process of appealing to persecutory
narratives such as the defense’s narrative of Turkish persecution in
Cartozian, and it is important to note that this process reflects specific
rhetorical strategies adopted by the participants in the cases as they
negotiated group identities amid the growing tensions between race,
religion, and nationality in the early twentieth century.177
According to Sam Keen, human beings create enemies “not
because we are intrinsically cruel, but because focusing our anger on
an outside target, striking at strangers, brings our tribe or nation
together and allows us to be part of a close and loving in-group,” or in
other words, “we create surplus evil because we need to belong.”178 It
is a mistake to conclude that “striking at strangers” creates this sense of
solidarity or belonging, however, for as Arthur Koestler writes, it is the
human capacity for devotion rather than aggression that causes wars.179

176. JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 203-222.
177. Legislative debates regarding the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act
also reflected an effort to establish identification through shared fear. For example,
during Civil War Reconstruction debates regarding whether the word “white” should
be removed from the Naturalization Act, Pacific Coast Senators warned of the threat
posed by rising numbers of Chinese immigrants which they described as a “mighty tide
of ignorance and pollution that Asia is pouring with accumulating force and volume
into the bosom of our country.” CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 2D SESS. 5120, at 5121-25,
5148-77 (1870). By contrast, during the debates regarding the repeal of the Chinese
Exclusion Act and the extension of the Nationality Act to provide for the racial
eligibility of Chinese people for naturalization during World War II, congressmen
appealed to China’s alliance with the United States in the war against the “bloody
Hirohoto dynasty of Japan,” noting that “today we are allied with [China] in every way
that a great and honorable people can be allied with another great people to fight for
the principles of government we hold so dear,” and “we must act together, and to act
together we must wipe out every vestige, whatever the cause may have been for its
enactment, which speaks contempt and disrespect for the great Chinese people.” 89
CONG. REC. 8598, 8598 (1943).
178. KEEN, supra note 28, at 17, 27.
179. ARTHUR KOESTLER, JANUS: A SUMMING UP 14 (1978). Koestler notes that most
wars are not fought for personal gain but “out of loyalty and devotion to king, country
or cause,” and crimes committed for selfish motives have been far outnumbered in
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In numerous instances throughout the discourse surrounding the racial
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, when the racial eligibility for
naturalization or the scope of the term “white” within the meaning of
the Act is expanded to include individuals or groups a passive or
persecutory agency is used to frame the actions of the petitioners.
When petitioners sought to establish their racial eligibility for
naturalization solely through direct evidence of assimilability, by
contrast, advancing narratives in which they played an active role by
recounting their history of conquests, development of civilized society,
or the discriminatory segregation of non-“white” people such as
Africans and aborigines, they were held to be racially ineligible for
naturalization even when they presented an impressive list of such
evidence. Moreover, numerous military expediencies expanded the
racial demographics of American citizenship through the naturalization
provisions of annexation treaties such as those discussed above and
legislative extensions of racial eligibility to military allies surrounding
World War I and World War II. Thus, although in Justice McLean’s
dissent in Dred Scott he argues that “on the question of citizenship it
must be admitted that we have not been very fastidious,”180 when
viewed from a rhetorical perspective the decisions regarding racial
eligibility for naturalization appear to flow from a consistent motive of
solidarity in defense of the nation, whether the perceived threats that
supported this motive were real or fictional. Throughout the discourse
surrounding the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, appeals to
unify against a common enemy nearly always accompanied findings of
racial eligibility for naturalization while similar appeals were nearly
always absent when racial eligibility for naturalization was denied.
Such appeals also frequently received an emphasis that suggests they
were considered particularly persuasive by comparison with other
factors that were used to racially classify the petitioners.
The contrast between these rhetorical strategies suggests that the
maxim “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” commonly used to
describe unification against a common enemy, might be more aptly
human history by those “massacred in unselfish loyalty to one’s tribe, nation, dynasty,
church, or political ideology, ad majorem gloriam dei.” Id. at 14, 77-78, 82-83, 89, 93
(“The crimes of Caligula shrink to insignificance compared to the havoc wrought by
Torquemada.”).
180. See Sandford, 60 U.S. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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formulated as “the victim of my enemy is my friend.” As Chris Hedges
explains the close bond felt by fellow soldiers in war:
The closeness of a unit, and even as a reporter one enters
into that fraternity once you have been together under
fire, is possible only with the wolf of death banging at
the door. The feeling is genuine, but without the threat of
violence and death it cannot be sustained.181
The unifying power of violent attacks such as Pearl Harbor and
September 11, as well as the many minor examples of threats in human
society, is in the first instance an effect not of anger but of fear, and is
intensified only when the enemy is rhetorically framed as the
aggressor. It is Armenians maintaining their Christianity in Asia Minor
by standing firm “in the face of tremendous odds” against “the
onslaught of Mohammedanism” perpetrated by Turks, Kurds, and
Syrian Muslims,182 or the “helpless Kalmuk minority,” who “without
warning and at gun-point,” were “herded into unheated railroad cars,”
“without benefit of food or water, many [dying] en route, while the rest
were scattered in various spots of the Soviet Union.”183 The powerful
force to unify against a common enemy, as in these examples, is not
created by banging at the door of the wolf of death, but by the wolf of
death banging at the door.
By illustrating how this rhetorical strategy operates in the racial
prerequisite cases, Cartozian also reveals the failure of the “historical
interpretation” of race as a substitute for racialist science in the case
law interpreting the racial prerequisites in the Act. Although the courts
of the early twentieth century that adopted the “historical
interpretation” of race openly recognized, as Ian Haney López notes,
that race is not “a biologically defined group, a static taxonomy, a
neutral designation of difference, an objective description of
immutable traits, a scientifically defensible division of humankind,
[nor] an accident of nature unmolded by the hands of people,”184 but a
highly contingent political commodity that is socially, culturally, and
historically constructed, they continued to enforce the racial
prerequisites in the Naturalization Act through a historiography that
181. HEDGES, supra note 26, at 115-16.
182. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 126-27; Cartozian Deposition
Transcript, supra note 77, at 35.
183. In re R–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 275, 280.
184. LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 107.
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was equally if not more capable of effecting racial divisions than
biological determinism. Rather than conclude that because race was
socially, culturally, and historically constructed the racial prerequisite
to naturalization was so ambiguous as to be impracticable of
application, the racial prerequisite courts of the early twentieth century
constructed racial classifications through a dramaturgy of enmity that
imagined American identity against perceived threats to the nation. The
fact that in Cartozian the defense constructed Armenian whiteness by
representing Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims as non-“white” when
these and other people from the Middle East had largely been held to
be “white” for purposes of naturalization even suggests that the form of
this rhetorical strategy itself may have been particularly important.
By shifting the focus to a rhetoric of fear that adapted itself to
changes in the geopolitics of the era, the ability of this rhetorical
strategy to transcend racial differences to unify against a common
enemy explains perceived contradictions in the racial prerequisite cases
where emphasis on direct evidence of assimilability fails. It is
important to emphasize that this was not a political ideology but a
rhetorical strategy, however, and that the geopolitics of the early
twentieth century only provided the material with which the
participants in the cases could rhetorically construct group identities.
The rhetorical situation of individual cases must be closely examined,
particularly the arguments and evidence advanced by the participants
and the identity issues implicated by the historical context at the time,
to understand the effect of persuasion on the cases. Although the courts
continued to exclude certain petitioners from naturalization on the
basis of race until the racial prerequisites were finally removed from
the Act in 1952,185 the broader threats to the nation that emerged during
the Second World War brought further erosion of the policy of racial
exclusion in naturalization as eligibility was extended to people in
China, India, and the Philippines to bolster their support for the war
effort, and judicial and administrative interpretations of the racial
prerequisite broadened in individual cases from similar motives, but
only after these threats and the solidarity to oppose them were
rhetorically constructed. It is perhaps fitting that in the final lines of the
last published judicial opinion in a racial prerequisite case, Judge
185. McCarran-Walter Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1952) (providing that the “right of a
person to become a naturalized citizen . . . shall not be denied . . . because of race”).
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Charles Wyzanski adopts this rhetorical strategy to advocate an end to
the policy of racial exclusion, writing that the policies of exclusion
reflected in the racial prerequisite to naturalization “are not only false
to our professions of democratic liberalism but repugnant to our vital
interests as a world power,” and
in so far as the Nationality Act of 1940 is still open to
interpretation, it is highly desirable that it should be
interpreted so as to promote friendlier relations between
the United States and other nations and so as to fulfill
the promise that we shall treat all men as created equal.
Petition for citizenship granted.186

186. Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. at 943.

